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ABSTRACT 
Naval Aviation, faced with budgetary pressures, decreasing buying power and 
increasing costs of aircraft and equipment, realized it had to change the way it did 
business in order to recapitalize.  The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) was formed to 
implement the aviation components of Sea Power 21 and Sea Enterprise, including 
modernization and recapitalization.  Through the implementation of AIRSpeed, the NAE 
strives to provide “the right amount of readiness at the right cost, so that money can be 
saved and returned to the Navy and Marine Corps to recapitalize the Fleet.” 
This thesis examines the NAE's effort to generate measurable cost savings toward 
recapitalization.  The background and implementation of AIRSpeed are reviewed.  It 
identifies cost savings attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives and investigates the relationship 
between costs savings and reinvestment and recapitalization. 
The results of this thesis reveal that the NAE is achieving measurable cost 
savings, but the cost saving has not been made available for recapitalization.  The thesis 
reveals some identifiable organizational challenges and change issues that inhibit the 
achievement of NAE’s goals.  These findings are used to develop and present a series of 
recommendations to assist the leadership to further align AIRSpeed programs with the 
recapitalization vision.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
During most of the 1980s, we seemingly had everything we needed to fly, 
fight and win.  There were resources available to recapitalize while 
sustaining our Naval Air Force.  In 1989, the world changed - the Berlin 
Wall came down - our country sought a peace dividend while our Navy's 
mission became increasingly more complicated.  (Malone, 2003) 
The abundance of resources available to the United States Department of Defense 
in the early to middle 1980's began a rapid decline that continued through the 1990's and 
into the 21st century.  In this austere budget environment, Naval Aviation became 
increasingly focused on individual programs at the expense of the whole.  (Malone, 2003)  
Along with the decline in overall defense funding, Naval Aviation found itself faced with 
a rapidly aging Naval Aviation force.  If left unchecked, the average age of Fleet aircraft 
would approach twenty years by 2010, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Aging Navy Systems in Need of Recapitalization.  (From: NAVAIR AIRSpeed 
Overview Brief, 2004) 
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As Naval Aviation attempted to recapitalize the force, unable to buy new and take 
care of the old, Naval Aviation entered into the ever-increasing downward spiral of a 
resource to requirement mismatch.  (Malone, 2003) 
Faced with continued budgetary pressures, decreasing buying power and 
increasing costs of aircraft and equipment, Naval Aviation realized that in order to 
recapitalize, they had to "get the money from someplace." (Steber, 2006)  The need for 
change in the way Naval Aviation did business was apparent.  The Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, identified the Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet (CNAP), as the single process owner for all Naval Aviation.  These first 
steps led to the formation of the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement 
Program (NAVRIIP) and later to the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE), which is the 
vehicle for fundamental change in Naval Aviation.  (Steber, 2006) 
In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, unveiled Sea Power 21 as the strategy for 
the Navy’s future.  It was supported by three core components:  Sea Shield, Sea Warrior 
and Sea Enterprise.  Sea Enterprise is the resource enabler for Sea Power 21, responsible 
for optimizing resources at every level in the Department of the Navy, including 
modernization and recapitalization.  In 2004, the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) was 
formed to implement the aviation components of Sea Power 21 and support the initiatives 
of Sea Enterprise. 
Naval Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR) had introduced industry-proven 
continuous improvement business process methodologies (Lean, Theory of Constraints 
and Six Sigma) at the maintenance depot level in 1999, under the title of AIRSpeed.  The 
intent was to deliver products to the Fleet faster at reduced costs. 
Through the collective AIRSpeed programs, the NAE strives to provide “the right 
amount of readiness at the right cost, so that money can be saved and returned to the 
Navy and Marine Corps to recapitalize the Fleet.” (Shrout, 2006)  One of NAE’s stated 
“measures of success" is achieving measurable cost savings across the Enterprise and to 
reinvest those savings to recapitalize the future of Navy and Marine Corps.” (Shrout, 
2006) 
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As in any business transformation, significant barriers exist to the achievement of 
the NAE’s savings and recapitalization goals.  These barriers may include leadership, 
culture, organizational structure, policies and competing budgetary requirements.  
Demonstrated achievement of incremental goals will be a key component of the long 
term success of the overall transformational effort.  
B. RESEARCH 
This research draws upon the effort of the Naval Air Enterprise (NAE) to deliver 
measurable cost savings that can be reinvested to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine 
Corp.  The research attempts to identify specific savings directly attributable to 
AIRSpeed initiatives and to link those savings to capital reinvestment programs.  This 
research will also review financial and managerial controls related to AIRSpeed 
initiatives that impact the feasibility of the stated savings and reinvestment goals. 
1. Primary Research Question: 
Has the implementation of AIRSpeed achieved measurable cost savings that have 
been made available to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine Corps? 
2. Supporting Research Questions: 
a. To what extent do current financial and managerial policies allow the 
generation of measurable cost savings? 
b. To what extent do current financial and budgetary requirements allow the 
reinvestment of generated cost savings? 
c. How are substantiated costs savings identified and linked to capital 
reinvestments? 
d. What method(s) can best demonstrate actual cost savings and capital 
reinvestments attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives? 
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C. BENEFIT OF THESIS 
This thesis will provide an analysis of the Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed 
program and the stated measure of success, harvesting measurable cost savings and the 
reinvestment of those savings to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine Corps.  It will 
provide an analysis of the relationship between savings and recapitalization.  It will 
attempt to identify challenges to the Naval Aviation Enterprise’s effective achievement of 
this goal, and if necessary deliver recommendations to overcome these issues. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a broad look, a deeper understanding, and 
an analytical perspective to the AIPSpeed effort.  This analysis will contribute to greater 
awareness by the NAE of the managerial, organizational and procedural barriers to the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise’s effective achievement of this goal and assist the leadership to 
further align AIRSpeed programs with recapitalization requirements.   
D. THESIS SCOPE 
The focus of this thesis is on cost savings and capital reinvestments attributable to 
AIRSpeed initiatives, related fiscal policies and budgetary requirements.  The time frame 
will be FY-2004 through FY-2006 to allow a year to year comparison following the 
implementation of Enterprise AIRSpeed in 2003.  Budgetary requirements and fiscal 
policy outside this scope will not be addressed. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis reviews the background and implementation of AIRSpeed.  It attempts 
to identify measurable cost savings attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives through the review 
and analysis of Naval Aviation budget plans and execution rates.  It investigates the 
relationship between costs savings and reinvestment and recapitalization initiatives 
through a comparison of budget Future Year Defense Plan forecasts, apportionment 
plans, and Department of the Navy, Office of Budget and Comptroller, Program Budget 
Information System (PBIS) database.  The resulting relationship is examined to develop a 
framework for controls and incentives best suited to align Naval Aviation Enterprise 
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saving and recapitalization initiatives with budgetary requirements.  Additional data and 
information were obtained from members of OPNAV N43, NAVAIR and CNAF staffs to 
supplement, clarify and confirm this research. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The research presented in this thesis is presented as follows: 
This chapter, Chapter I, establishes the historical context and the change 
imperative faced by Naval Aviation resulting in the establishment of NAE AIRSpeed.  
Thesis purpose, scope, and methodology are discussed. 
Chapter II, Literature Review provides a summary of leading organizational 
systems and change management theorists.  Overall, this chapter provides the background 
information to address organizational issues raised throughout the remainder of this 
thesis.  The study of the systems models and change management theory enables the 
analysis of the NAE and the identification of barriers to the achievement of NAE 
objectives. 
Chapter III, Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed, provides background 
information on the philosophy, concepts and processes that are collectively NAE 
AIRSpeed.  This chapter first presents a brief discussion of the organizational structure of 
the NAE and the history of AIRSpeed, followed by the concepts and methodologies of 
NAE AIRSpeed. 
Chapter IV, Presentation of Data, presents the findings obtained from various 
sources to determine if Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) AIRSpeed initiatives have 
generated measurable savings that have been made available to recapitalize the future 
Navy and Marine Corp.  This chapter addresses the primary research question as well as 
the secondary questions relating to the identification of cost savings and the financial, 
budgetary and managerial policies involved in the reinvestment of stated savings. 
Chapter V, AIRSpeed Analysis, provides an analysis of the Naval Aviation 
Enterprise (NAE) and the implementation of AIRSpeed as an organization change effort.  
The focus is on the ability of NAE AIRSpeed to achieve measurable cost savings that can 
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be reinvested for recapitalization.  This analysis will examine the role of the NAE 
organizational structure and change management process in regards to maximizing 
AIRSpeed benefits toward the goal of recapitalization. 
Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations, presents a series of conclusions 
and recommendations based on this evaluation. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents background information on a number of subject areas in 
order to build a framework upon which to discuss topics raised throughout the remainder 
of this thesis.  Organizational change is presented and discussed through several models 
presented by established academic theorists.  These theorists discuss what is required for 
effective organizational change followed by a discussion on the importance of execution.  
Next, this chapter discusses the application of cost management theory to government 
and military organizations.    A summary identifies the similarities between the models 
and their application to the analysis presented in the remainder of this thesis. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
1. Henry Mintzberg.  Organization Design: Fashion or Fit? 
Henry Mintzberg's article presents the argument that an organizations design is 
critical to its effectiveness and ultimate success.  He states: 
Like all phenomena from atoms to stars--the characteristics of 
organizations fall into natural clusters, or configurations.  When these 
characteristics are mismatched--when the wrong ones are put together, the 
organization does not function effectively, does not achieve a natural 
harmony.  (Mintzberg, 1981) 
In order to design effective organizations, leaders and managers must account and 
plan for the "fit."  Mintzberg describes the concept of "fit" though five distinct 
organizational configurations that clearly differ in their structure and in their ideal 
situational uses.  They are identified as simple structure, machine bureaucracy, 
professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form and adhocracy.  (Mintzberg, 1981)  Each 
organizational configuration is composed of five adaptable component parts: strategic 
apex (top management), operating core (basic work force), middle line (middle 
management), technostructure (analysts and design systems support personnel) and 
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support staff (indirect support services).  The combination of these parts and their fit in 
the organization relative to the other parts determine the organizational configuration.  




Figure 2.   Mintzberg's Organizational Configuration.  (From: Raynolds, 2003) 
In Mintzberg’s model the purpose of the structure is the coordination and division 
of work; who does what and to what extent. This division of work determines the 
organization’s configuration.  Mintzberg identifies five coordinating mechanisms: 
a. Coordinating Mechanisms 
(1) Direct supervision.  Coordination is achieved at the strategic 
apex through orders given by the top management, resulting in a simple structure. 
(2) Standardization of work.  Coordination is achieved through 
word and process standards designed by an extensive administrative staff and 
technostructure, resulting in a machine bureaucracy. 
(3) Standardization of skills.  Coordination is achieved through the 
high level of training among employees.  The operating core is composed of educated 
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and skilled professionals who require a significant support staff.  Middle line and 
technostructure are minimal, resulting in a professional bureaucracy.  
(4) Standardization of outputs.  Coordination is achieved through 
extensive oversight of the middle line managers, who are often allowed autonomy over 
divsionalized units.  Middle line managers must insure that outputs meets standards set 
across the entire organization despite operating autonomy, resulting in the divsionalized 
form.  
(5) Mutual adjustment.  Coordination is achieved through the use 
of sophisticated specialists and support staff, often through the use of project teams.  
Distinctions between line and staff tend to break down resulting in the adhocracy 
configuration.  
The resulting five organizational configurations, elements of 
structure and situational characteristics determine how all the elements form an integrated 
system.  Below is a discussion of these configurations. 
b. Organizational Configurations  
(1) Simple structure.  The simple structure is noted for what it is 
not.  It is not elaborate, it has little or no technostructure, few support staff and a small 
cadre of middle management.  Behavior norms are not formalized and there is little use of 
training and planning.  Power is centralized with top management, the strategic apex.  In 
the simple structure, the strategic apex often consists of only one person. 
The simple structure is non-sophisticated and dynamic.  The 
environment can be evaluated and understood by a single individual, enabling decision 
making and control of the organization to remain with that single individual. 
(2) Machine bureaucracy.  The machine bureaucracy is 
characterized by formalized procedures, rules, regulations and highly specialized yet 




grouping for task accomplishment.  Power and decision making is relatively centralized 
with a complex administrative structure that emphasizes the distinctions between line and 
staff.   
The machine bureaucracy depends on the standardization of 
operating processes to insure coordination throughout the organizational.  For this reason 
the technostructure is key in this configuration.  The technostructure analyzes and 
develops the standards that govern the organization.   
Machine bureaucracies are normally found in large and mature 
organizations that depend on repetition and standardization.  Management at the strategic 
apex tends to focus on improving the bureaucratic processes while a large middle line 
emerges to oversee the standardized work of the operating core.  The organization 
remains departmentalized to the top levels, where the formal power is centralized.  
(Mintzberg, 1981)  Machine bureaucracies strive to deliver their desired outputs by the 
most efficient means.  These are "performance organizations", not "problem solving 
organizations."  (Organizational Configurations (Mintzberg), 2007) 
(3) Professional bureaucracy.  The professional bureaucracy relies 
on the standardization of skills for coordination.  It relies upon trained professionals, 
skilled people who required considerable control over their work.  The organization 
surrenders a great deal of its power to the professionals as well as the associations and 
institutions that select, train and certify the professionals in the first place.  (Mintzberg, 
1981)  As a result, the organizational structure becomes decentralized, with strategic and 
operating power flowing all the way down to the professionals in the operating core.  
(Mintzberg, 1981)   
Because the individual professionals work independently, the size 
of the operating core can become very large, but require very few middle line managers.  
On the other hand, the support staff for the professionals is very large.  The support staff 
performs tasks much different than the professionals, often the simple routine tasks not 
performed by the higher priced professionals.  As a result a dual hierarchy develops 
between the professional operating core and the large support services staff.  Each 
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hierarchy emerges with differing power structures, one democratic with bottom-up power 
for the professionals, and a second autocratic with top-down control for the support staff.  
(Mintzberg, 1981) 
The professional bureaucracy is most effective for organizations in 
a stable yet complex environment.  (Mintzberg, 1981)  However, the professional 
bureaucracy is inflexible.  It is well suited to produce standardized outputs but ill-suited 
to adapt to new outputs or services.  Change cannot be effectively implemented through 
the appointment of new administrators or leaders announcing major reforms.  Rather, 
change seeps in by the slow process of changing the professionals.  (Organizational 
Configurations (Mintzberg), 2007)  
(4) Adhocracy.  The adhocracy is a fluid organization with very 
little formalization of job tasks or behavior.  Several dissimilar specialists may be 
grouped into small project teams for operating tasks.  There is a high reliance on mutual 
adjustment as the key coordinating mechanism, within and between teams 
(Organizational Configurations (Mintzberg), 2007) 
The adhocracy does not rely upon the standardization of skills of 
the specialists for coordination because this would lead to further standardization when 
the desired result is innovation.  In an adhocracy the experts must combine efforts in 
pursuit of the organization's desired output, focused on innovation. 
In an adhocracy, there is a multitude of managers; from functional 
managers to project managers.  Managers become active members of teams with the 
specific responsibility of fostering communication and coordination.  Formal authority, 
the distinction between management and operating core, dispersed and becomes blurred 
throughout the organization.  Additionally, the distinction between line and staff also 
disappears. 
The adhocracy operates in environments that are complex and 
dynamic, requiring sophisticated innovation and the cooperative efforts of many different 
kinds of experts.  (Mintzberg, 1981)  Although adhocracies may be effective they are also 
inefficient.  Nothing gets done without extensive discussions, ambiguity abounds and 
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there is significant opportunity for conflict and political pressure.  "Adhocracy can do no 
ordinary thing well, but it is extraordinary at innovation."  (Mintzberg, 1981) 
c. Configurations as Diagnostic Tools 
Mintzberg's configurations are abstract ideals that simplify the complex 
world of organizational structures.  In this model, every organization reacts to five pulls 
that underlie these configurations; the pull to centralize by the top management, the pull 
to formalize by the technostrucure, the pull to professionalize by the operators, the pull to 
divisionalize by the middle line managers and the pull to collaborate by the support staff.  
(Mintzberg, 1981)  The organization will tend to become closely organized around the 
configuration that favors the dominant pull.   
Managers can use this set of five configurations as a tool in diagnosing the 
problems of organizational design.  They can improve their organizations by being aware 
of the different pulls resident and the configurations toward which they are drawn and 
insuring that the internal elements of the organization are consistent.  Mintzberg warns 
that "management that grabs at every structural innovation that comes along may be 
doing its organization great harm, it risks going off in all directions."  (Mintzberg, 1981)  
By remaining aware of the nature of their organization, managers can avoid attempts to 
improperly fit the latest management fad with negative consequences. 
Mintzberg also states that an organization may be in balance and 
consistent but be destroyed by the imposition of external controls.  The simple structure, 
professional bureaucracy and adhocracies will suffer the most from imposition of 
external controls resulting from increased government control over previously 
independent organization and the tendency for any organization to become more 
bureaucratic as it grows and becomes a larger divisionalized organization.  (Mintzberg, 
1981)  The application of external controls could very well hinder the accomplishment of 
the desired result if the applied external control is not appropriate the organizational 
configuration. 
Each organization or configuration develops its own norms, traditions, 
beliefs and ideology.  Unless there is a balance among opposing forces, the prevailing 
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ideology will tend to dominate.  This can become problematic for an organization if there 
is a part of the organization that requires special attention, or more likely increase 
autonomy.  Administrative standards, when applied to this segment of an organization, 
can result in poor fit in relation to the rest of the configuration. 
d. Fit over Fashion 
The right configuration in the wrong environment often occurs as the 
external environment changes around the organization.  In this case the organization has 
two choices, it can continuously adapt to the environment through continuous redesign at 
the expense of internal consistency, or it can maintain internal consistency at the expense 
of a gradually worsening fit with the environment.  (Mintzberg, 1981)  The organization 
must choose between evolution and revolution.  The organization that chooses evolution 
may find that it cannot evolve at the same pace as the environment and must ultimately 
revolutionize to regain a proper fit. 
Mintzberg concludes that: 
Consistency, coherence and fit are the critical factors in organizational 
design, but they come at a price.  An organization cannot be all things to 
all people.  It should do what it does well and suffer the consequences.  Be 
an efficient machine bureaucracy but don't pretend to be highly adaptive.  
Or be an adaptive adhocracy and do not pretend to be highly efficient. Or 
create some new configuration to suit your own needs.  The point is not 
really which configuration you have; it is that you achieve configuration.  
(Mintzberg, 1981)   
2. David A. Nadler with Mark B. Nadler.  Champions of Change: How 
CEO's and Their Companies are Mastering the Skills of Radical 
Change 
Nadler and Nadler write that "real change is an integrated process that unfolds 
over time and touches every aspect of the organization."  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  In 
Champions of Change: How CEO's and Their Companies are Mastering the Skills of 
Radical Change, they discuss this integrated process and its relationship to the real world 
organizations through the application of complimentary models developed over the 
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previous twenty years.  The models that form the basis of this discussion are the 
Congruence Model and the Cycle of Change Model. 
a. Why Change Efforts Fail 
Numerous organizations have been faced with the challenge of change and 
have failed.  Nadler and Nadler present five major mistakes that organizations make that 
cause change efforts to fail.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(1) Top executives abdicate their responsibility for personal 
commitment and involvement and try to delegate the leadership of change. 
(2) Small numbers of people, in secrecy, develop change strategies 
and unleash them upon an unprepared and uncooperative organization. 
(3) Executives choose a particular set of strategic initiatives 
without generating full discussion of all the possible alternatives. 
(4) Organizations make crucial decisions on incomplete and biased 
information. 
(5) Organizations cling to the misguided hope that one single 
concept will deliver organizational change. 
Some organizations, however, do deliver on successful 
organizational change.  What do these organizations do differently to avoid the mistakes 
listed above?  They seek organizational change through deliberate, long-term, and 
focused collection of efforts and activities - a process grounded in the integrated 
approach to change.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  The integrated approach to change is the 
basis of the theories presented by Nadler and Nadler through their models. 
b. Concept of Integrated Change 
Nadler and Nadler begin with the premise that organizations are human 
institutions.  Although each organization should have a strategy and objectives, at the 
center of each organization is a complex social system, comprised of four specific and 
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tightly interrelated components.  Listed below, these components must become congruent 
with the strategy before the strategy can succeed.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(1) The work.  The activities of the organizations employees 
required to create, produce and deliver the desired output. 
(2) The people.  All the employees that support the organization's 
operations. 
(3) The formal organization.  The structures, processes, and 
systems that organize activities and direct the people in the performance of their work. 
(4) The informal organization.  The organization's collective 
values, attitudes and beliefs, unofficial channels of communication and influence and 
accepted standards of behavior. 
Each of these components is directly tied to and influenced by the 
others.  Nadler and Nadler state that this simple notion has enormous implications given 
the inherent complexity of organizations; there can never be one single solution aimed at 
one specific aspect of the organization that can bring about successful organizational 
change.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
c. The Congruence Model - Understanding Organizations 
According to Nadler and Nadler, the first step to any change effort is to 
figure out how the organization works and identify the trouble spots and areas of 
opportunity.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  They present the congruence model as a tool to 
assist managers in understanding and predicting patterns of organizational behavior and 




Figure 3.   The Congruence Model.  (From: Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
The Congruence Model, as depicted in Figure 3, describes the set 
of interrelated components as they are affected by external elements of inputs, undergo 
some sort of transformation and emerge from the system as outputs. 
(1) Inputs originate outside the organization and include 
environment, resources and history.  The environment consists of all the forces, 
conditions and players outside the boundaries of the organization.  Resources are the 
assets that have potential value for the organization in light of the demands and 
opportunities and constraints of the external environment.  History comprised of the past 
events and activities that influence the workings of the organization today.  (Nadler & 
Nadler, 1998) 
(2) Strategy represents the set of decisions made by the 
organization about how to configure resources, demands, opportunities, and constraints 
of the environment in the context of history.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(3) Output represents the ultimate purpose of the organization and 
describes the pattern of activities, behavior, and performance of the system at three 
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levels.  The system level looks at goods and services produced, revenues and profits, 
employment, community impact and others.  Units are the departments, divisions and 
teams that make up the organization.  In outputs the model looks at the individuals; the 
behavior, activities and performance of the people within the organization.  (Nadler & 
Nadler, 1998) 
(4) Work defines the activity of the organization, the basic and 
inherent tasks performed by the organization and its parts.  When analyzing work one 
must consider the skills and knowledge level of the people, what rewards are derived 
from the work, what is the degree of uncertainty associated with the work, and what are 
the constraints or demands placed upon the work in the context of strategy? (Nadler & 
Nadler, 1998) 
(5) People are described through four characteristics in order to 
diagnose any organizational system.  These four characteristics are knowledge and skills, 
needs and preferences, perceptions and expectations, and demographics. 
(6) The formal organization is the set of arrangements, structures, 
systems, and processes each organization develops for grouping people, the work they 
do, and then coordinating their activity in ways designed to achieve the strategic 
objectives.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(7) The informal organization includes the unwritten, emerging 
arrangements and interaction patterns that overlap the formal structure and processes.  It 
includes the organizational culture; the values beliefs and behavioral norms, the informal 
rules and practices, patterns of communication and influence, and the actual behavior of 
leaders rather than their prescribed roles.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
The basis of the congruence model is that you cannot ignore any 
aspect of the system.  All components, relationships and dimensions and interactions 
must be considered.  The model says, "There is no one best structure.  There is no best 
culture.  What matters is fit."  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
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d. Organizational Fit 
The concept of fit is crucial to understanding the congruence model.  In 
this system the interaction of the components is more important than the individual 
components.  The overall effectiveness of the organization depends on the internal 
congruence, or fit of the basic components.  The tighter the fit or the greater the 
congruence, the more effective the organization will be in transforming its strategy into 
performance.  In the world of organizational change, identifying the points at which the 
fit is breaking down is the vital first step in determining what has to change.  (Nadler & 
Nadler, 1998) 
e. Cycle of Change 
Nadler and Nadler incorporate previously presented concepts and model in 
their “cycle of change.”  The change cycle follows a logical flow and provides guidance 
for planning and managing the most complex and discontinuous change.  (Nadler & 
Nadler, 1998)  The model is explained through five phases; 1) recognizing the change 
imperative, 2) developing a shared vision, 3) implementing change, 4) consolidating 




Figure 4.   Cycle of Change.  (From: Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
Nadler and Nadler's five phases of the cycle of change are summarized 
below (Nadler & Nadler, 1998): 
(1) Recognizing the change imperative.  The first step is to use the 
congruence model to analyze each of the organization's components and how they work, 
or don't work.  Strategic objectives must be compared to actual performance to determine 
the extent of the need for change. 
(2) Developing a shared direction.  This step includes providing 
clear direction for change and building a coalition that will support the change effort.  
The first step in this phase is to communicate the fundamental direction of the change.  
The details may come later, but the expression of some basic direction is essential. 
(3) Implementing change. The implementation of change overlaps 
some of the other phases in the cycle but includes: 
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• Redefining strategy and rethinking the nature of the work 
required to employ that strategy 
• Redesigning the organization's formal structures, systems 
and processes. 
• Rebuilding the operating environment of the organization 
and creating informal arrangements that support the new 
strategy and work requirements. 
• Restaffing: making sure that the right people are in the right 
jobs in keeping with the new strategy, structure, work, and 
culture. 
These steps are crucial; each one must be considered as an integral 
part of the change process, not an afterthought. 
(4) Consolidating change involves three major activities.  The first 
is communication and diagnosis; find out what is working and what isn't.  The second 
activity is refinement; processing the information gathered with all the tools available, 
figuring out which aspects of the change are working and which aren't.  Then going back 
and fine-tuning the plan accordingly.  Consolidation occurs when what was once the 
"new" change becomes integrated into the organizational fabric.  This activity requires a 
wide range of techniques, ranging from political activity to broaden and deepen support 
to compensation, staffing, training, work requirements and the operating environment. 
(5) Sustaining change requires top leaders to maintain vigilance 
while the organization returns to normalcy.  It remains critical that the lines of 
communication remain open so that leaders can determine which aspects of the change 
are working and which need attention.  Nadler and Nadler recognize that the sustainment 
phase does receive as much attention as the previous phases; however they emphasize its 
importance: 
This final sustaining phase also continues the consolidation stage, in that 
management needs to constantly reassess the effectiveness of each 
element of the change program and stay sufficiently flexible to modify the 
plan when necessary.  This is the time to iron out the fit - to reconnect the 
web of relationships among the organizational components that had to be 
ripped apart to clear the way for radical change.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
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Nadler and Nadler emphasis the importance of thinking of 
discontinuous change as a cycle rather than a linear process.  "The final stage of the 
change cycle always contains the seeds of the next cycle."  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
f. Final Principals 
Coming full circle from the five mistakes organizations make that cause 
change efforts to fail, Nadler and Nadler present five final principles for leaders to 
employ when embarking on a major change effort. 
(1) Ensure appropriate involvement.  Leaders must take the time to 
actively involve the key people who will bear the responsibility for making the change 
not only happen but succeed.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(2) Exercise committed leadership.  Effective change must be led 
through the personal involvement of active leaders who inspire and excite the entire 
organization.  Nadler and Nadler very eloquently summarize this point: 
The best leaders are those who understand the need to articulate a vision 
and goals that appeal on an emotional level to the basic values and highest 
aspirations of their people, who deeply believe in the benefits of getting 
people fully engaged, and who then motivate people to go out and act.  
(Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(3) Provide valid information.  Effective change requires that 
everyone involved have full access to the full range of information required to make 
appropriate decisions at each step of the process.  Decision makers must look beyond the 
normal and obvious information sources, both inside and outside the organization.  This 
principal includes disseminating information as well as collecting it; the sharing of 
information will buy trust and credibility throughout the organization.  (Nadler & Nadler, 
1998) 
(4) Make informed choices.  Full and open consideration of the 
widest possible range of alternatives will result in the best decisions.  "Whether it is 
strategy, structure, staffing or any other aspect of change, it's essential that top 
 22
management insist upon and then actively engage in free, open, and informed debate of a 
wide range of alternatives."  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
(5) Construct integrated change.  The successful integrated change 
of complex human organizations requires the consideration of every aspect of the 
enterprise.  The congruence model provides the framework for a disciplined assessment 
of each component of the organization; strategy, structure, people, processes and 
operating environment.  The relationships and interdependence of each component on the 
others must be appreciated and accounted for in any integrated change effort.  Nadler and 
Nadler emphasis this point, "There is no place in the change process for fragmented 
actions and one-off decisions.  Ignore the web of relationships that make up the 
organization and you will fail in a hundred ways."  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998) 
In summary, Nadler and Nadler recognize that integrated change is 
hard, demanding work that requires energy, courage, vision and commitment.  There will 
always be setbacks and moments of doubt.  However, successful change is based in the 
return to the above five principals which are based on their models of congruence and the 
cycle of change.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  
3. John P. Kotter.  Leading Change 
John P. Kotter presents his eight-step model for transforming organizations in his 
book Leading Change.  This model provides a valuable tool to managers and the leaders 
of change. 
a. Why Organizations Fail to Transform 
Similarly to Nadler and Nadler, Kotter begins his discussion with an 
explanation as to why so many organizations fail to transform.  He presents the following 
common errors when transforming and organization (Kotter, 1996): 
• Allowing too much complacency 
• Failing to build a substantial coalition 
• Not understanding the need for clear vision 
• Failing to clearly communicate the vision 
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• Permitting roadblocks against the vision 
• Not planning for short term results and not realizing them 
• Declaring victory too soon 
• Neglecting to anchor changes in corporate culture 
Kotter states that these errors are not inevitable, and can either be avoided 
or at least mitigated.  The key is to understand why organizations resist change, the 
multistage process to achieve it, and most of all, how leadership is critical to drive the 
process in a socially healthy way.  (Kotter, 1996)  To prevent these mistakes, Kotter 
developed the related Eight-Stage Change Process. 
b. The Eight-Stage Change Process 
Kotter bases his methods for successful transformations on one 
fundamental insight: that major change will not happen easily.  (Kotter, 1996) 
Even if an objective observer can clearly see that costs are too high, or 
products are not good enough, or shifting customer requirements are not 
being adequately addressed, change can still stall because of inwardly 
focused cultures, paralyzing bureaucracy, parochial politics, a low level of 
trust, lack of teamwork, arrogant attitudes, a lace of leadership in middle 
management, and the general human fear of the unknown.  (Kotter, 1996) 
Kotter's Eight-Stage Change Process is designed to combat these barriers 
and is directly associated with the eight fundamental errors. 
(1) Establish a sense of urgency.  Establishing a sense of urgency 
is crucial to gaining needed cooperation for change.  With complacency high, few people 
are even interested in working on the change problem.  With urgency low, it is difficult to 
form a group with enough power and credibility to guide the effort or convince key 
individuals to commit the necessary time to create and communicate the change effort. 
There are several sources of complacency, from the lack of 
sufficient communication and feedback, poor internal measurement systems and 
standards, to too much "happy talk" from leadership and most notably the absence of a 
major and visible crisis.  Kotter suggests raising the level of urgency in the organization 
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through a variety of ways, including; creating a crisis, eliminating examples of excess, set 
extraordinarily high targets and goals, insist on accountability for broad measures of 
performance, distribute performance and satisfaction information, increase contact with 
dissatisfied partners, force relevant data and "honest" discussions into meetings and to the 
entire organization, and finally, bombard people with information on future opportunities 
and rewards and the organizations inability to pursue those opportunities.  (Kotter, 1996) 
(2) Create a guiding coalition.  The first step to forming a team that 
can guide a change effort is to find the right membership.  Kotter presents four key 
characteristics that are essential to effective guiding coalitions.  (Kotter, 1996) 
• Position power: Enough key players must be on board with 
enough influence to overcome attempts to block progress 
• Expertise: Various points of view, relevant to the task, must 
be adequately represented to make informed, intelligent 
decisions. 
• Credibility: Group members must have good reputations. 
• Leadership: Group must have enough proven leaders to 
drive the change process. 
Leadership and management must work in tandem on the guiding 
coalition; management keeps the whole process under control and leadership drives the 
change.  (Kotter, 1996) 
(3) Develop a vision and strategy.  Kotter defines vision as "a 
picture of the future with some explicit commentary on why people should strive to 
create that future."  (Kotter, 1996)  Good vision provides three purposes; clarifies the 
general direction for change, it motivates people to take action in the right direction and it 
helps coordinates the actions of different people.  Kotter states that effective visions seem 
to have six key characteristics (Kotter, 1996): 
• Imaginable.  Conveys a picture of what the future will look 
like. 
• Desirable:  Appeals to the long-term interests of 
employees, customers, stockholders, and others who have a 
stake in the enterprise 
• Feasible:  Comprises realistic, attainable goals. 
• Focused: Is clear enough to provide guidance in decision 
making. 
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• Flexible: Is general enough to allow individual initiative 
and alternative responses in light of changing conditions. 
• Communicable: Is easy to communicate; can be 
successfully explained within five minutes.  
The creation of an effective vision takes time, includes the efforts 
of many people, and must include both logic and an emotional connection. 
(4) Communicating the change vision. Kotter explains that the 
power of a vision is unleashed only when the majority of those involved in an enterprise 
or activity have a common understanding of the goals and direction.  (Kotter, 1996)  He 
lists seven key elements common to effective communication of vision.  (Kotter, 1996) 
• Simplicity: All jargon and technobable must be eliminated. 
• Metaphor, analogy and examples: A verbal picture is worth 
a thousand words. 
• Repetition: Ideas sink in deeply only after they have been 
heard many times. 
• Leadership by example: Behavior from important people 
that is inconsistent with the vision overwhelms other forms 
of communication. 
• Explanation of seeming inconsistencies: Unaddressed 
inconsistencies undermine the credibility of all 
communication. 
• Give and take: Two-way communication is always more 
powerful than one-way communication. 
(5) Empowering broad based action.  The purpose of this phase is 
to remove as many barriers as possible to the implementation of the change vision.  Any 
obstacles, systems, structures or supervisors that undermine the vision must either be 
changed or eliminated.  Kotter presents five elements of empowering people to effect 
change (Kotter, 1996): 
• Communicate as sensible vision to employees: If 
employees have a shared sense of purpose, it will be easier 
to initiate actions to achieve that purpose. 
• Make structures compatible with the vision:  Unaligned 
structure block need action. 
• Provide the training employees need: Without the right 
skills and attitudes, people feel disempowered. 
• Align information and personal systems to the vision: 
Unaligned systems also block needed action. 
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• Confront supervisors who undercut needed change: 
Nothing disempowers people the way a bad boss can. 
(6) Generating short-term wins.  This phase generates and sustains 
momentum generated in the previous phases of the transformation process.  The 
transformation process most often very lengthy, measured in years, allowing multiple 
opportunities for motivation to fall and momentum to stall.  Short-term wins provide 
concrete feedback on the validity of the vision against performance.  A good short term 
must be highly visible, unambiguous and clearly related to the change effort.  (Kotter, 
1996)  Short-term wins help the transformation process at least six ways.  (Kotter, 1996) 
• Provide evidence that the sacrifices are worth it: Wins 
greatly help justify the short-term costs involved. 
• Reward change agents with a pat on the back: After a lot of 
hard work, positive feedback builds morale and motivation. 
• Help fine-tune vision and strategies: Short-term wins give 
the guiding coalition concrete data on the viability of their 
ideas. 
• Undermine cynics and self-serving registers: Clear 
improvements in performance make it difficult for people 
to block needed change. 
• Keep bosses on board: Provides those higher in the 
hierarchy with evidence that the transformation is on track. 
• Build momentum: Turn neutrals into supporters, reluctant 
supporters into active helpers. 
Short term wins cannot be left to luck, they must be planned.  
Leaders of the change effort must plan for and generate the short-term performance 
indicators.  The point is not to maximize short-term wins at the expense of the future, but 
to make sure that visible results lend sufficient credibility to the transformation effort.  
(Kotter, 1996) 
(7) Consolidating gains and producing more change.  During this 
phase change agents build upon the momentum and credibility generated in previous 
phases by through short-term wins.  Change is focused on all systems, structures and 




work force by hiring, promoting and developing people who can implement the change 
vision.  And ultimately, reinvigorate the change process with new projects, themes and 
change agents.  (Kotter, 21) 
Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost 
and regression may follow.  Until changed practices attain a new 
equilibrium and have been driven into the culture, they can be very fragile.  
(Kotter, 1996) 
(8) Anchoring new approaches in the culture.  Once an 
organization has achieved the desired transformation, the changes must be ingrained 
throughout the enterprise.  The connection between the new behavior and the new found 
success must be articulated to sustain success.  Kotter offers the following considerations 
when anchoring change in a culture.  (Kotter, 1996): 
• Cultural change comes last, not first: Most alterations in 
norms and shared values come at the end of the 
transformation process. 
• Depends on results: New approaches usually sink into a 
culture only after it’s very clear that they work and are 
superior to the old methods 
• Requires a lot of talk: Without verbal instruction and 
support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of 
the new practices. 
• May involve turnover: Sometimes the only way to change a 
culture is to change key people 
• Make decisions on succession crucial. 
Successful change goes through all eight stages, normally in the 
order presented.  (Kotter, 1996)  Although an organization may be operating in all phases 
at once, skipping any step or moving too far ahead with out the solid foundation 
established by the previous steps almost always creates problems.  (Kotter, 1996)  When 
change follows the eight phases in sequence, “it will build and develop in a natural way, 





c. Leadership vs. Management 
Kotter emphasizes the importance of leadership throughout the eight-stage 
process.  He claims that successful transformation is 70 to 90 percent leadership and only 
10-30 percent management.  (Kotter, 1996)  “Leadership defines what the future should 
look like, aligns people with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen despite the 
obstacles.” (Kotter, 1996)  On the other hand management deals with structural and 
systematic aspects of the organization; like staffing, budgeting and problem solving.  
Kotter warns that visions and strategies are not formulated by individuals that have 
learned only to deal with plans and budgets and are not implemented well by people who 
think in terms of structure, systems and cycle time.  (Kotter, 1996)   However, managing 
change is important.  Without competent management, the transformation process can get 
out of control.  But the bigger challenge is leading change.  Only leadership can blast 
through the many sources of inertia.  (Kotter, 1996) 
4. Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan.  Execution: The Discipline of 
Getting Things Done 
Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan explain the discipline execution; the behaviors 
and techniques required for organizations to succeed.  Their concepts are not unique and 
in fact, are consistent with the models previously presented.  Their focus is on "results" or 
the bottom line. 
a. What is Execution? 
How do we successfully achieve the desired results or intended change?  
Bossidy and Charan state that there are three key points to understanding execution.  
(Bossidy, Charan, & Burck, 2002): 
• Execution is a discipline, and integral to strategy. 
• Execution is the major job of the business leader. 
• Execution must be a core element of an organizations culture. 
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These three concepts form the foundation of Bossidy and Charan's work.  
These three points are explained in detail, but the common theme of the discussion is 
process, communication, leadership and culture.  Bossidy and Charan state: 
Execution is the systematic process of rigorously discussing the whys and 
whats, questioning, tenaciously following through, and ensuring 
accountability.  It includes making assumptions about the business 
environment, assessing the organization's capabilities, linking strategy to 
operations and the people who are going to implement the strategy, 
synchronizing those people with the various disciplines, and linking 
rewards to outcomes.  It also includes the mechanisms for changing 
assumptions as the environment changes and upgrading the company's 
capabilities to meet the challenges of an ambitious strategy.  (Bossidy et 
al., 2002) 
b. Execution is the Job of the Leader 
The ability of an organization to execute is fully dependent on the 
leadership.  The leadership has to be fully engaged, both personally and professionally, 
with a comprehensive understanding of the business, its people and the environment.  
(Bossidy et al., 2002)  Bossidy and Charan present seven essential behaviors of a leader: 
(1) Know your people and your business.  Leaders are presented a 
lot of information, but it is filtered and tainted with the perceptions, limitations, agendas 
and perspectives of those who prepared and delivered it.  Effective leaders make the 
effort to understand their people’s strengths, weaknesses, potential and limitations. They 
take extraordinary measures to understand an issue, what it would take to execute an 
initiative, what skills and attributes would be required of the organization's people and 
what resources would be needed.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
(2) Insist on realism.  This is the heart of execution.  Realism must 
be the goal of all dialogue in an organization.  Realistic dialogue flushes out important 
issues or problems, allowing leadership to make appropriate decisions on priorities and 
resources.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
 30
(3) Set clear goals and priorities.  Set a very few, clear, 
understandable goals that will influence the overall performance of the organization.  
Keep the list short and simple.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
(4) Follow through.  Set up a follow through mechanism that 
ensures everyone is doing what they are supposed to do.  This may be in the form of 
regular progress review meetings or progress reports.  Follow through validates the merit 
of an initiative maintains focus on execution.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
(5) Reward the doers.  Reward people accordingly for producing 
specific results.  Make it clear that rewards and respect are based on performance and 
insure that these distinctions become ingrained in the organizational culture.  (Bossidy et 
al., 2002) 
(6) Expand people’s capabilities.  Coaching is the single most 
important part of expanding other people’s capabilities.  The aim is to ask questions that 
bring out the realities and give people the help they need to correct problems.  It is how 
leaders pass on their knowledge to the next generation, individually and collectively.  
(Bossidy et al., 2002) 
(7) Know yourself.  Good leaders learn and develop an awareness 
of their strengths and weaknesses.  Through this knowledge they develop character and 
emotional fortitude.  Emotional fortitude allows a leader to deal honestly with himself, 
others and the organization, provide forthright assessments, tolerate diversity, accept 
divergent viewpoints and remain open to both positive and negative information.  
(Bossidy et al., 2002) 
Bossidy and Charan state that the behavior of a leader is, 
ultimately the behavior of the organization and is the foundation of the culture.  (Bossidy 
et al., 2002)  As such, we can see why they consider leadership to be the most critical 




c. Creating the Framework for Change 
Bossidy and Charan present a reality based framework for organizational 
change that is based on execution.  They introduce their discussion of change with: 
Most efforts at cultural change fail because they are not linked to 
improving the business's outcomes.  To change a business's culture, you 
need a set of processes -- social operating mechanisms -- that will change 
the beliefs and behavior of people in ways that are directly linked to 
bottom-line results.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
Bossidy and Charan explain that to achieve successful change, people's 
behavior must be changed.  To accomplish this they state that the desired results must be 
clearly stated and how to achieve them clearly explained.  Individuals who achieve the 
desired results should be rewarded while those that do not should receive additional 
coaching, have rewards withdrawn, be reassigned or let go.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  These 
concepts are further explained in four key organizational change concepts presented 
below: 
(1) Linking reward to performance.  The foundation of changing 
behavior is linking rewards to performance and making those linkages transparent.  “That 
which gets appreciated, respected and ultimately rewarded, defines an organization's 
culture.”  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  People will understand what the organization values and 
recognizes.  In their own self interest, people will then concentrate on those aspects of 
their behavior. 
(2) The social software of execution.  Bossidy and Charan compare 
an organization to a computer, having both hardware and software.  They link a 
computer's software to the human aspect of an organization, recognizing it as a social 
system and naming it "social software."  (Bossidy et al., 2002) "Social software" contains 
the values, beliefs and norms of behavior.  Hardware includes the organizational 
structure, rewards and compensation system, communications system, and the 
hierarchical distribution of power.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  The "social software" provides 
the life to the organizations hardware, resulting in a functional system. 
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Contained within the organizations social software are the 
"software operating mechanisms."  The software operating mechanisms are the "formal 
or informal meetings, presentations, even memos or e-mail exchanges -- anywhere that 
dialogue takes place"  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  Additionally, they "are where the beliefs 
and behaviors of the social software are practiced consistently and relentlessly and spread 
the leaders' beliefs, behaviors and mode of dialogue through the organization."  (Bossidy 
et al., 2002)  The authors describe linking the software operating mechanisms to the 
measurement and reward systems resulting in concept of a "social operating system," 
which drives the organizations culture.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
(3) Robust Dialogue.  An execution culture, critical to effective 
change, requires a dialogue that brings reality to the surface through openness, candor 
and informality.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
Robust dialogue makes an organization effective in gathering information, 
understanding the information, and reshaping it to produce decisions.  It 
fosters creativity--most innovations and inventions are incubated through 
robust dialogue.  Ultimately, it creates more competitive advantage and 
shareholder value.  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
Robust dialogue begins when people maintain an open mind.  They 
avoid preconceptions and private agendas.  Next is candor, when people voice their real 
opinions, not those that will please others.  Harmony is not the intent of a robust dialogue 
and can in fact stifle critical thinking.  The authors advocate the motto "Truth over 
harmony."  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  Informality encourages dialogue and with it the desired 
candor.  Finally, robust dialogue is not complete without closure.  At the end of the 
dialogue, the participants must agree about each person's responsibilities; who is going to 
do what and when.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  
(4) Leaders get the behavior they exhibit and tolerate.  Leaders 
must remain engaged in the daily life of the organization to change and sustain the 
culture.  The authors quote Dick Brown, "The culture of a company is the behavior of its 
leaders."  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  The leader must create, display and relentlessly reinforce 
the desired behaviors through example and robust dialogue.  Bossidy and Charan explain 
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that you change the culture of a company by changing the behavior of its leaders, and you 
measure the change in culture by measuring the change in personal behavior of its leaders 
and the performance of the business.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  In this explanation there is 
no mention of the people or systems of the organization, the focus is clearly on leadership 
and overall organizational performance. 
Although Bossidy and Charan discuss the above four concepts as 
critical to achieving organizational change, they maintain a heavy emphasis on execution.  
Execution remains a constant requirement for successful achievement organizational 
goals and organizational change. 
C. COST MANAGEMENT 
1. Dale R Geiger.  Winning the Cost War 
Dr. Dale Geiger presents his concept of cost management of government 
organizations and programs through the terms and concepts of military battle.  His book, 
"Winning the Cost War," describes the process of interactive cost based management.  
Lieutenant General Thomas P. Carney describes the concept: 
The process is based on a simple premise; productivity gains will be 
achieved when the creative power of the organization's workforce is 
unleashed by continuously challenging them to identify ways to improve 
performance, cut costs and reapply resources to higher priority endeavors.  
(Geiger, 2000) 
a. Nature of the Cost War 
For over sixty years government organizations received lavish funding 
levels that resulted in a spending mode of management.  The Anti-Deficiency Act and 
current budget execution practices have created a culture where good financial 
management focuses on “spending” the budget rather than on continuously improving 
productivity.  (Geiger, 2000)  Additionally, organizations that spend less than budget are 
perceived to have lost resources and are in danger of receiving lower budgets in the 
future.  Strong pressures exist to spend all appropriated funds.  In fact, the executive 
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branch is legally bound to spend the funds appropriated by Congress.  These factors have 
created a management culture with a spending vice conserving mentality, “good financial 
management within the executive branch has come to mean spending 99.9% of the 
budget.”  (Geiger, 2000)  
Geiger proposes that government organizations have not managed costs 
well simply because they didn’t have to manage costs well.  (Geiger, 2000)  The 
historically high funding levels removed any necessity for efficiency.  However, today’s 
reduced resources pose a significant threat to mission capability and are forcing 
government organizations to recognize the importance of cost management.  Geiger 
offers his Interactive Cost Based Management model as a tool for government 
organizations to affect sound cost management practices. 
b. Interactive Cost Based Management 
Geiger dismisses the assumption that government cannot manage itself 
well by observing that government has not had to manage costs well in the last sixty 
years.  (Geiger, 2000)  He notes that military leaders are premier cost managers in the 
arena of the battlefield.  Military commanders start with objectives and missions provided 
by higher authority and they seek to accomplish that mission with the lowest possible 
cost in people and resources; an implicit cost/benefit analysis.  (Geiger, 2000) 
The Interactive Cost Based Management model is fashioned after the 
Navy’s Command, Control, and Communication paradigm; consistent perception 
(intelligence gathering), warrior (managerial) pull, collaborative planning and execution.  
(Geiger, 2000)  Applying cost management techniques to this paradigm, Geiger offers the 























Figure 5.   Interactive Cost Based Management Paradigm.  (From: Geiger, 2000) 
The paradigm is based on good reconnaissance, planning and after action 
review coordinated by strong leadership.  (Geiger, 2000)  It is based on decentralized 
accountability and recognizes the need for cost measurement processes that provide 
relevant information that lead to better decisions and drive the desired consumption 
behaviors.  Managerial costing provides the information (or reconnaissance).  Planning 
provides the forethought and promotes preemptive vice reactive actions.  After action 
cost review completes the accountability loop and insures the continuous learning 
process.  Finally, the leadership, the Cost Warrior’s role in guiding and coordinating the 
other activities is critical and cannot be delegated.  (Geiger, 2000)   
(1) Cost Warrior Pull.  The leadership, or Cost Warrior, must 
specify what will be measured and how the information will be presented.  This 
specification is the key to achieving relevant cost information and should be based on the 
requirement, frequency, level of detail and applicability.  Additionally, leaders must 
clarify their intent and provide a concept of operations that allows subordinates to vary 
from the original plan when necessary in pursuit of the overall goals.  (Geiger, 2000)  
And finally, the leader must follow through with reviews of the organization's cost 
performance.  
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(2) Cost Planning.  This concept is based on a cycle of 
commitment and review that encourages learning and improvement.  It begins with a 
forecast of future cost performance, reached through reasonable cost projections 
negotiated with upper management.  This routine establishes a commitment to 
performance and provides a standard for accountability.  (Geiger, 2000)   
The forecast must be separate from traditional budgeting drills.  It 
should focus on management objectives that have short feedback cycles and where 
adjustments can be made.  Geiger notes that if the budget process is pushed down to the 
lower levels of an organization; the long feedback cycle creates the view that the budget 
is a spending entitlement rather than a target for continuous improvement.  (Geiger, 
2000) 
In a culture of continuous improvement, the forecast is viewed as 
dynamic.  The expectation is that the forecast will be continuously tightened to encourage 
innovation and efficiency.  As an organization's cost management improves resources 
will become available to be applied to higher priority requirements.  (Geiger, 2000) 
(3) After Action Cost Review.  This phase provides the 
performance measure of actual results against forecasts and explains the differences.  
This review provides the basis for accountability.  It is in this phase that improvement 
gains are recognized and plans for additional improvement are generated.  It consists four 
major components (Geiger, 2000): 
• Present results compared to forecast.  Managers will gain 
understanding of their performance through the analysis.  
Personal accountability is established. 
• Reconcile and explain results.  Identify both problems and 
successes.  This provides an important opportunity for 
learning. 
• Prepare and present a plan of action.  This is a specific plan 
that lists critical actions to be completed and signals 
command expectations.  The specificity should include: 





• Submit forecast for the next reporting period, incorporating 
lessons learned.  Continued refinement of the forecast is 
expected, to more closely reflect reality.  Again, it should 
be based on realistic cost projections and negotiations with 
upper management.  
(4) Managerial Costing.  This process develops and provides 
credible measurement of the true cost of resource consumption.  Managerial costing is 
responsive to the organizations managers and provides relevant information needed to 
make sound decisions and motivate desired behaviors.  For this reason there is no "one 
size" that "fits all" managerial costing system; the system must be tailored to the leader 
and the organization. Geiger emphasizes that during the costing process, the selection of 
the cost drivers must consider the behavioral motivation, measurement credibility and 
cost of the measurement itself.  The driver must be credible, useful, and not costly to 
measure.  (Geiger, 2000)  As such, a legitimate managerial costing system provides 
realistic awareness of the cost of resources, reducing the demand for resources.  This is 
the basis of sound cost management. 
Dale Geiger has presented his unique model for managerial cost 
management in government organizations.  He has done this through a comparison with 
the military model of command and control.  He has described a cycle that begins with 
the leadership setting the expectations and requirements.  The organization supports the 
leadership expectation with a costing system that illuminates the relevant cost of 
resources and allows for a review of the findings and performance.  Based on historical 
cost data, the organization then commences cost forecasting for the next period, and the 
cycle begins again.  Geiger's model relies heavily on individual accountability, individual 
and organizational learning, and continuous improvement. 
D. SUMMARY 
This literature review has presented a number of concepts, theories and models 
that provide a framework upon which to discus topics raised throughout the remainder of 
this thesis.  First, Mintzberg argues that an organization's design is critical to its 
effectiveness and success.  The organizational structure must "fit" the work performed or 
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the output desired.  Nadler and Nadler build upon these concepts and add that 
organizations are interactive with the external environment and with every internal 
element.  One cannot make changes in any element of an organization without 
considering the impact throughout the entire organization.  They further discuss these 
implications on types of change and the cycle of change.  Nadler and Nadler conclude 
that organizational change is an integrated effort requires energy, courage, vision, and 
committed leadership.  John P. Kotter presents his eight-step model of change 
emphasizing that change occurs in a series of phases that must each be completed in 
entirely and in order for significant change to take hold.  He emphasizes leadership, 
coalitions, vision, strategy, communication and generating short-term wins, and 
anchoring change in the new culture.  Bossidy and Charan review many of the concepts 
presented earlier in their focus on execution.  They argue that execution is integral to 
strategy, the primary job of the leader and the core of organizational culture.  
Additionally, they present their model for executing organizational change through 
execution.  Finally, Dale Geiger presented his unique concept of cost based management 
in government and military organizations.  Throughout his book, he utilized several of 
the concepts presented by Bossidy and Charan.  Execution is essential in Geiger's 
analogy of cost management. 
These authors and theorists have provided a clear and comprehensive discussion 
of the organization as a structure and an integrated system.  They have provided relevant 
considerations for effective organizational change and finally a systematic strategy for 
cost management. 
These theories are relevant to the analysis and evaluation of the Naval Aviation 
Enterprise as they provide a framework against which to examine the role of the NAE 
organizational structure, change management process and cost management practices in 
regards to maximizing AIRSpeed benefits toward the goal of recapitalization.  The 
concepts and applications presented in this chapter provide the analytical tools to evaluate 
and understand the progress of the Naval Aviation Enterprise change effort by detailing a 
systematic approach to evaluating an organization as a system and transformational 
change as a process.  
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III. NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE AIRSPEED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide information on the background, philosophy, concepts 
and processes that are collectively Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed.  In order to 
establish a foundation for this discussion this chapter first presents a brief discussion of 
the organizational structure of the Naval Aviation Enterprise and the history of 
AIRSpeed.  This chapter then presents the concepts and methodologies of Naval Aviation 
Enterprise AIRSpeed. 
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, unveiled Sea Power 
21 as the strategy for the Navy’s future.  It was supported by three core components:  Sea 
Shield, Sea Warrior and Sea Enterprise.  Sea Enterprise is identified as the resource 
enabler for Sea Power 21, responsible for optimizing resources at every level in the 
Department of the Navy, including modernization and recapitalization.  In 2004, the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) was formed to implement the aviation components of 
Sea Power 21 and to support the initiatives of Sea Enterprise. 
1. Purpose of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) 
The NAE was formed as a partnership between multiple organizations within 
Naval Aviation to resolve interdependent issues that affect multiple commands.  This 
construct was viewed as transformational within the Navy, where individual 
organizations adopted a corporate model to foster inter-organizational communication, 
alignment and integration.  Expectations included stimulated productivity, change 
facilitation, optimization of resources, cost management and the efficient generation of 
operational readiness.  The vision of the NAE is “to deliver the right force, with the right 
readiness, at the right cost, at the right time -- today and in the future.” (Zortman, 
Massenburg, & Kilcline, Thomas J., Jr., 2005)  The NAE intends to achieve this vision 
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through single process ownership that will establish a culture of cost-wise readiness 
(achieving the right readiness at the right cost), improved material management, and 
balanced logistical support with reduced turnaround times. 
NAE measures efficiency and effectiveness through a single Fleet-driven metric 
of “aircraft and carriers ready for tasking at reduced cost.” (Zortman et al., 2005)  This 
metric is the standard against which the NAE measures the ability to deliver readiness 
tied to Fleet-driven demand, including reduced cycle time, improved quality and 
reliability, reduced costs and implementing process efficiencies. 
2. Naval Aviation Enterprise Organizational Structure 
 The NAE organization is modeled after a corporate structure as diagramed below 
in Figure 6.  It is comprised of a Board of Directors (BOD) with a six member executive 
steering committee composed of Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) as the Chief 
Executive Officer; Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) as the Chief 
Operations Officer; Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL) as the Enterprise 
Readiness Officer; Total Force Readiness Officer (AIR 1.0 NAVAIR) for policy and 
personnel; a Chief Financial Officer (AIR 6.8, NAVAIR) and OPNAV N88 for 
acquisition and procurement.  A variety of supporting commands that directly impact 




Figure 6.   Naval Aviation Enterprise Structure.  (From: Shrout, 2006) 
 
 The primary commands that support operational readiness and incur costs include 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP).  These commands are structured as a “triad” to support Fleet requirements, 
as depicted in Figure 7.  The single process owner is CNAF, who directs and monitors the 
requirements.  Fleet requirements are presented and funded through the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and then the systems commands (NAVAIR, 
NAVSEA and NAVSUP) execute the requirements. 
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Figure 7.   The Naval Air Enterprise Triad (From: Shrout, 2006) 
 
 The NAE Board of Directors is supported by three cross-functional teams (CFTs); 
titled Total Force CFT, Readiness CFT and Cost Management CFT.  The primary 
responsibilities of each team are shaping force structure, generating fleet readiness and 
managing costs, respectively between the commands that comprise the NAE Triad.  Each 
CFT is chaired by a member of the NAE Board of Directors. 
 Integrated within the CFTs are Type Model Series (TMS) teams, responsible for 
the daily management of specific aircraft types (F-18E/F, P-3C, SH-60R, etc.)  The TMS 
teams consist of the members of the NAE Triad that are specifically responsible for that 
specific aircraft type.  They work closely with the operational wings to support squadron 
demands in the form of budgetary, material and maintenance resources.  The purpose of 
the TMS team is to eliminate barriers between different organizations within the NAE to 




 AIRSpeed is the application of industry-proven process improvement 
methodologies to the business of Naval Aviation.  It is a strategy and set of established 
best business management tools intended to increase efficiency and productivity, 
resulting faster delivery of products to the Fleet at reduced cost.  The tools are Lean, 
Theory of Constraints (TOC) and Six Sigma.  Through the application of these initiatives, 
the NAE intends to harvest efficiencies in the way it does businesses, thus guaranteeing 
the future of Naval Aviation.  (Zortman et al., 2005) 
1. History of AIRSpeed 
 AIRSpeed began as four separate programs.  Depot AIRSpeed was started in 1999 
with the mission of reducing cycle-time, improving productivity and establishing a 
culture of continuous process improvement.  Enterprise AIRSpeed began in 2003 and 
aligned the organizational, intermediate and depot level supply and repair processes to 
the demands of the Fleet.  (Shrout, 2006)  Enterprise AIRSpeed was designed to insure 
that operational units were provided the correct resource entitlements while properly 
managing costs, directly supporting the initiatives of the Readiness CFT.  Depot 
AIRSpeed and Enterprise AIRSpeed were integrated in 2004.  NAVAIR AIRSpeed was 
established in 2004 to extend the continuous process improvement philosophies to the 
transactional and non-production service environments of the "providers" in NAE Triad.  
NAVAIR AIRSpeed's focus is on cultural change to enable the personnel of NAVAIR to 
become more productive, efficient and reduce costs in the management of research and 
development, test and evaluation, and acquisitions.  Lastly, Naval Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP) AIRSpeed was initiated in 2005 to improve corporate competencies and 
productivity in integrated supply chain management between NAVSUP and the NAE.  In 
October 2006, all four AIRSpeed programs were collectively brought under the umbrella 
Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed to provide the BOD enterprise-wide visibility on all 
AIRSpeed activities and ensure the proper prioritization and coordination of efforts. 
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2. AIRSpeed and Continuous Process Improvement 
AIRSpeed is a blend of several continuous process improvement (CPI) 
methodologies.  The three primary CPI tools are Lean, Six Sigma and Theory of 
Constraints (TOC).  The application of these principles is focused on achieving the 
desired level of readiness while delivering appropriate inventory levels at the right time 
and at reduced operating costs.  Below is a short discussion of each methodology: 
a. Lean 
Lean is focused on the elimination of waste from a process.  Waste is 
defined as anything that is not necessary, or provides "no value added," relative to 
customer value and the production of a product or a service.  (Womack & Jones, 1996)  
The goal of Lean is to achieve perfection through the total elimination of waste in the 
value stream; including time, space, motion and resources.  Constant and incremental 
improvements are used to balance operational requirements and the standard production 
workflow.  The emphasis is on the minimization of resources used and on increasing flow 
through the production process.  Five essential elements of Lean are listed below 
(Dennis, 2002): 
• Identify what creates value in the eyes of the customer 
• Identify the process or sequence which creates the value and 
eliminate waste 
• Make the activity flow as the customer pulls the product or service 
through the system 
• Involve and empower workers 
• Continuously strive to perfect the process 
Lean theory relies on the "Five S's" to create a simplified visual 
workplace, one that is self-explaining, self-ordering and self-improving.  (Dennis, 2002)  
The simplicity of the visual workplace accelerates the identification and elimination of 
waste in the process.  The “Five S’s” are (Dennis, 2002): 
• Sorting – Clean house , remove unnecessary items 
• Storing – Organize in order of the process; create a place for 
everything 
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• Shining – Physically clean everything, putting everything in its 
place 
• Standardize – Maintain order and keep everything accessible and 
ready to use 
• Sustaining – Resist returning to the old methods 
The application of Lean goes beyond the production floor.  One example 
is the design phase, where most costs for a product are established.  The choice of 
materials and engineering configurations will impact future reliability, time to repair and 
ultimately repair costs.  Risk must be balanced between product design and financial 
returns. 
Leadership is critical to sustaining the culture of Lean.  The culture will be 
transferred throughout the organization only through the coaching and guidance of the 
more experienced Lean champions.  (Womack & Jones, 1996)  It is leadership that 
insures that the organizational goals are implemented, acted upon, validated, revised (if 
necessary) and sustained. 
b. Theory of Constraints (TOC) 
TOC is a management philosophy that aims to continually achieve more 
of the goal of a system.  It is based on the belief that any organization has at least one 
constraint and that the greatest Return on Investment (ROI) will be obtained through 
improvements to that constraint.  In order to manage the performance of the system, the 
constraint must be identified and managed correctly through the Five Focusing Steps 
listed below.  (McMullen, 1998):  
• Identify the constraint (the primary obstacle to achieving the goal). 
• Decide how to exploit the constraint (create a plan for the constraint 
that best supports the organization's goal). 
• Subordinate and align all other processes to the above decision. 
• Elevate the constraint (if required, increase capacity of the 
constraint). 
• If, as a result of these steps, the constraint has moved, return to Step 
1.  Do not let inertia become the constraint. 
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As constraints are identified and exploited, system throughput is increased 
and non-value added activity is removed from both the constraints and other processes.  
Continuous identification and exploitation of the remaining primary constraint allows 
high returns in increased throughput for the effort spent on the improvement process. 
A primary concept of TOC is the application of market-demand pull 
supply-chain management.  In previous systems, components and parts are “pushed” to 
the end users.  Historically, in the aircraft intermediate maintenance activities, 
components were inducted regardless of whether they were required.  In the “pull” 
system, actual flight-line demand (operational requirements) and the time it takes to 
reliably replenish (TRR) dictates inventory buffer levels and times to induct components 
into the repair process.  (Shrout, 2007) 
c. Six Sigma 
Six Sigma is a management methodology based on the assumption that 
process capacity will be increased through a reduction in process variation.  It is a quality 
measurement and improvement method that focuses on the control of a process until the 
point of six sigma (standard deviations), from the centerline, or 3.4 defects per million 
items produced.  (Stamatis, 2004)  Six Sigma identifies quality factors as determined by 
customer needs.  Then, through the use of facts, data, statistical analysis, and diligent 
attention to managing the process, it reduces variation, improves capabilities and 
increases stability. 
The Six Sigma model is highly disciplined and focused on delivering near 
perfection in the production of products or services.  It is statistically based and assumes 
that if you can measure the number of defects in a process, you can figure out how to 
eliminate them.  A typical Six Sigma process has the following five stages often referred 
to as DMAIC.  (Stamatis, 2004): 
• Define: clarify and narrow the scope of the problem in a way that 
measurable goals can be achieved.  Examine the process in detail, 
develop improvement suggestions and then implement the 
recommendations. 
• Measurement: Gather data on the process and prepare for analysis. 
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• Analysis: the process is mapped and documented; the quality of the 
data is verified and then analyzed.   Initial analysis normally 
focuses on identifying people's failures to act as needed or ensure 
effective controls at each stage of the process. 
• Improvement: recommend, decide and implement process 
improvements 
• Control: create controls that enable and sustain the improvements. 
Six Sigma performance improvements result from decreased process 
variation and the development of a highly repeatable process.  Reductions in the number 
of defects requiring rework lead create customer satisfaction, increased organizational 
morale and a reduction in production costs. 
NAE AIRSpeed is focused on aligning these business methodologies and a 
culture of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) throughout the organization in order to 
achieve mission requirements with reduced resources.  AIRSpeed focuses the entire 
Enterprise on aligning and optimizing all maintenance, supply and administrative support 
functions in support of operations in order to achieve this goal.  The expected outcome is 
to reduce the cost of Naval Aviation while meeting current and future readiness 
requirements.  
3. Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program 
The Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) 
applies continuous process improvement techniques to the operational level of the NAE.  
Through NAVRIIP, the NAE gains an increased understanding of the operational cost 
drivers within Naval Aviation.  NAVRIIP is focused on achieving "aircraft ready for 
tasking at reduced cost" by creating a culture of Cost-Wise Readiness and continuous 
process improvement.  (Zortman et al., 2005) 
Implemented in concert with Enterprise AIRSpeed in 2003, NAVRIIP changed 
the way the Navy provides manpower, equipment, maintenance, supply and training to 
Naval Aviation commands.  The goal is to align the interactions between the maintenance 
and logistics activities in support of the operational requirements.  To accomplish this, 
NAVRIIP measures inventories, reliability, cycle time, and costs, to identify and resolve 
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barriers to improvement.  (Zortman et al., 2005)  The collected data are processed and 
reported in a standardized format.  The standardized reports are utilized by Type Model 
Series (TMS) teams to manage readiness and costs at the operational level, remove 
barriers throughout the organization and monitor progress, and provide leadership the 
visibility to make informed decisions. 
4. Defining AIRSpeed Benefits 
All activities within NAE AIRSpeed are responsible for reporting financial 
benefits attributable to AIRSpeed initiatives.  In order to establish a baseline for the types 
of benefits gained the NAE has established the below definitions (Naval Aviation 
Enterprise AIRSpeed Concept of Operations, Draft Edition, 2007): 
Type I Benefits: 
• Real dollars that can be used to offset dollars previously taken out of the 
budget (wedges) or can be used for emergent Naval Aviation Enterprise 
needs. 
• Have a direct and certain impact on NAE resources.  There is a clear cause 
and effect relationship between the project and resources. 
• There is a permanent reduction in costs / assets. 
• Include benefits to entire NAE: NAVAIR, CNAF, NAVICP and Fleet 
Readiness Centers (FRCs)1. 
• Examples of Type I benefits include reductions in labor costs, facility 
costs, scrap and material costs, and contract costs. 
Type II Benefits: 
• Are associated with waste elimination, where assets/resources are feed up 
to be reassigned to other value-added work and/or potential future 
benefits. 
• Examples of Type II benefits include cost avoidance from AIRSpeed 
efficiencies and the reduction of repair assets, reduction and reallocation 
of space requirements, and reduced future resource requirements due to 
process improvements.  
                                                 
1 In October 2006, the first Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) was stood up.  The FRCs will integrate 
former Depot-level and Intermediate level maintenance activities in compliance with recommendations 
made during the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure legislation. 
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Type III Benefits: 
• Represent projects that are associated with productivity gains, such as 
improvements in Cost-wise Readiness or quality of NAE products and 
services.   
• Examples of Type III benefits include: improved quality of work life, 
customer satisfaction and loyalty, employee motivation and satisfaction 
and faster response time. 
This study focuses on Type I benefits as they represent real dollars that can be 
harvested and reapplied to other priorities or reinvested for recapitalization.  The 
distinction between types of benefits becomes critical when evaluating the impact of 
AIRSpeed initiatives on the business of Naval Aviation and meeting the stated objectives. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a brief discussion of the background, history, philosophy, 
concepts and processes that are collectively Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed.  
AIRSpeed was introduced as four separated initiatives across Naval Aviation between the 
1999 and 2005.  These initiatives were designed to introduce and implement industry-
proven best business practices to the business of Naval Aviation from the maintenance 
and supply to administrations and procurement.  In general, AIRSpeed is the application 
of the management tools of Lean, Theory of Constraints and Six Sigma.  In 2004 the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise was formed to align Naval Aviation after a corporate model to 
provide oversight and foster cooperation, communication and issue resolution between 
the multiple commands of Naval Aviation.  In 2006, all AIRSpeed initiatives were 
combined under the NAE to provide single process ownership, oversight, management 
and decision making authority across the Enterprise.  As a means of evaluating and 
measuring the gains of NAE AIRSpeed, the benefits have been defined as Type I, II, and 
III; from hard savings that can be reinvested to soft productivity gains and organizational 
improvement. 
Through this discussion, a background and understanding of the Naval Aviation 
Enterprise and NAE AIRSpeed has been established that will provide the basis for the 
analysis and evaluation of NAE AIRSpeed that comprises the remainder of this study. 
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IV. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings obtained from various sources to determine if 
Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) AIRSpeed initiatives have generated measurable 
savings that have been made available to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine Corps.  
Overall, this chapter will answer the primary research question as well as the secondary 
questions relating to the identification of cost savings and the financial, budgetary and 
managerial policies involved in the reinvestment of stated savings. 
This research identified the procedures utilized for the accounting of AIRSpeed 
savings and benefits.  It attempted to link identified savings (or benefits) to 
recapitalization.  This research also evaluates the effectiveness of cost saving initiatives 
within the current financial, budgetary and managerial framework.  This chapter presents 
the findings of this research and its implications. 
Information was gathered from community briefs, documents, and informal 
interviews to capture the insights of the variety of commands and activities that comprise 
the NAE.  The information sought was related primarily to the claimed savings 
attributable to various activities as well as the application of the identified savings.  Most 
interviews were informal; discussing areas specific to each individual's roles and 
responsibilities in regards to the NAE, AIRSpeed and the research data requested.  
Respondents consisted primarily of AIRSpeed program managers, implementation 
managers and comptrollers. 
B. COST SAVINGS INITIATIVES 
The first continuous process improvement initiatives were introduced to Naval 
Aviation in 1999.  These predecessors to AIRSpeed included the independent 
introductions of Lean at Oceana, VA, and Lemoore, CA, and Theory of Constraints at 
NAVAIR Depot Cherry Point and Intermediate Maintenance Activity North Island.  As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, these initiatives were combined under the purview of 
Enterprise AIRSpeed in 2003, concurrent with the implementation of the Naval Aviation 
Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP).  Together, Enterprise 
AIRSpeed and NAVRIIP were to enable operational cost-wise readiness through the 
application of process improvement tools to all levels of maintenance, supply and 
operations. 
As the focus of this thesis begins in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, cost savings (or 
reductions) due to the implementation of Depot/Enterprise AIRSpeed was the initial 
focus of this research.  As Enterprise AIRSpeed and NAVRIIP were established in 2003, 
and the NAE was formed in 2004, there was not yet any framework of financial 
accounting established for the identification, tracking and reporting of FY-2004 cost 
reductions.  "No real benefits for 2004 were captured or tracked to the point of 
granularity."  (Novak, 2007b)  AIRSpeed results were reported in terms of efficiencies 
and productivity increases, which are today defined as Type II (efficiency and 
productivity) benefits by the NAE.  The below testimony on AIRSpeed benefits was 
delivered to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, in April 
2005: 
Depot AIRSpeed initiatives have resulted in: an improvement in turn 
around time for the CH-46 aircraft at Cherry Point Depot from 215 to 170 
days and work in process dropped from 28 aircraft to 18, using the same 
staff level; a drop in the turnaround time for EA-6B re-wing at the 
Jacksonville Depot from 594 days to 450 and work in process dropped 
from 16 aircraft to 9, with 5 of the last 7 delivered ahead of schedule; and 
at North Island Depot, we've seen a reduced turnaround time on the F/A-
18 aircraft from 192 to 132 days and work in process dropped from 31 
aircraft to 16.  (Hugel, 2005) 
FY-2005 marked the first indication of identified financial cost reductions 
attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives that could be classified as Type I benefits (real dollars 
that could be used to offset dollars previously taken out of the budget or used for 
emergent Naval Aviation Enterprise needs).  The NAE reported that the Flying Hour 
Account was fully executed in 2005, with $163 million remaining (5% under budget) that 
was made available to offset other emergent execution year bills such as fuel and health 
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care costs.  (Skinner, 2006)  Subsequently, beginning in FY-06 over $131M per year was 
removed from the Flying Hour Program due to anticipated future AIRSpeed efficiencies 
within the intermediate and depot level aviation maintenance activities.  (Wood, 2007)  
This equated to an $820.9M budget reduction across the Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP). 
Other FY-2005 AIRSpeed savings were identified by the NAE as the result of 
manpower reductions within intermediate and depot level maintenance activities.  The 
savings were associated with the elimination of 212 billets and were calculated to be 
$11.2M at the presidential budget rate for those positions.  The billets were returned 
under the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN), account and utilized by Commander, Fleet 
Forces Command (CFFC) to stand up other programs.  (Linsteadt, 2007)  The NAE 
identified the savings associated with these reductions, calculated them across the FYDP 
and reported them as Type I savings in FY-06 and subsequent years.  
AIRSpeed financial efficiencies for FY-06 and after are presented by the NAE as 
benefits vice savings, as "the connotation for savings is for someone to take them." 
(Novak, 2007a)  FY-06 financial benefits totaled $46.5M Type I benefits and $82.3M 
Type II (efficiency and productivity) benefits.  These benefits were presented by the 
AIRSpeed activities that report to the NAE as illustrated in Table 1.  It must also be 
stated that these benefits were reported as progress against existing budget "wedges” 
(dollars taken out of the budget due to mandated reductions).  Ideally, if an organization 
were able to realize benefits that recovered the exiting "wedge," then funds could be 
realigned by the Enterprise to address other funding requirements. 
 
Activity Type I Benefits Type II Benefits 
Fleet Enterprise $22.6M $43.7M 
Depot 0 $22.7M 
NAVICP $1.4M $1.8M 
NAVAIR $22.5M $14.1M 
Total $46.5M $82.3M 
Table 1.   FY-06 NAE AIRSpeed Benefits (From: Novak, 2006)   
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The FY-2006 Type I benefits attributed to Fleet Enterprise also included the 
$11.2M in FY-05 manpower cuts2 and $11.4M in FY-2006 as the benefits continue to be 
counted across the FYDP.  (Novak, 2006)  The remainder of FY-06 NAE AIRSpeed 
Type I benefits, $23.9M, were attributed to NAVAIR and NAVICP initiatives. 
In summation; the NAE began identifying financial benefits attribute to 
AIRSpeed in FY-2005.  Cumulative Type-I benefits for the year of execution were 
identified as $174.2M in FY-2005 and $23.9M in FY-2006.  When applied across the 
FYDP, Type I benefits totaled $822.2M from FY-2005 benefits and $147.8M from FY-
2006 benefits.  No Type I benefits were identified for FY-2004. 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY OF COST SAVINGS 
This research attempted to identify the procedures utilized for the accounting of 
AIRSpeed savings and benefits.  It attempted to link claimed savings (or benefits) to 
recapitalization. 
The organizational structure and reporting hierarchy within the NAE was in 
constant flux during the period of this research.  Multiple methods were identified for 
accounting for NAE AIRSpeed financial benefits.  As discussed earlier, the framework 
for this accounting did not exist when the NAE was established in 2004.  The lack of 
established norms resulted in inconsistent reporting methods and tracking of benefits.  
Correspondingly, early benefits (FY-04) were reported in terms of efficiency gains; 
reductions in turnaround times and work in process (Type II benefits).   
Financial benefits (Type I) for FY-2005 were accounted for through two 
measures.  The first was based on fund accounting, in which expenditures are tracked 
through various special use accounts and drawn against an established budget.  The 
CNAF Flying Hour Program savings of $163 million was identified as the fund balance 
remaining upon the execution of the required annual expenditures.  Additionally, these 
                                                 
2  FY-2005 manpower benefits were included in the FY-2006 Type I benefits as they were not 
captured for presentation purposes in FY-2005 
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savings were tracked though NAVRIIP.  Monthly costs were measured and displayed 
against the budget profiles, allowing the calculation and analysis of budget variances. 
The second accounting measure utilized for identified FY-2005 savings was the 
simple calculation of the costs associated with the 212 billets eliminated from the 
intermediate and depot level maintenance facilities.  Although the manpower cost 
reduction was identified as a Type I savings by the NAE, no real savings was realized by 
the greater Sea Enterprise.  The billets were returned and reassigned at the CFFC level.  
Additionally, no other Type I savings were identified at the intermediate and depot level 
maintenance facilities.  "In almost two years of gathering data from all our former I-level 
and Depots (now FRCs), we have not shown any Type I savings except for the directed 
manpower cuts we took in FY-05."  (Linsteadt, 2007) 
The final accounting method discussed was employed in FY-2006 by NAVAIR.  
The AIRSpeed Deployment Management System (ADMS) is a commercial web-based 
software system designed to improve the process of data gathering, validation and 
reporting of Lean Six Sigma projects.  NAVAIR uses the system to manage AIRSpeed 
projects from initial project idea inception, through project selection, benefit validation 
and ultimately savings realization.  Financial benefit calculation, tracking and validation 
are only one aspect of the management system.  It also manages document preparation, 
training, performance monitoring and lessons learned and replication opportunities. 
ADMS utilizes a standardized process to validate financial benefits, or cost 
savings.  The process begins with the completion of the Financial Benefits Workbook 
(FBW) by the project leader.  The FBW requires the project leader to identify (by cost 
element and time period) the current baseline costs of the process, the new or non-
recurring (one-time only) costs of implementing AIRSpeed changes and the post-
implementation improved process costs.  The projected cost savings are the net difference 
between the baseline costs and the new non-recurring plus the post-implementation costs.  





Baseline Costs  $250,000
New or Non-Recurring Costs $25,000  
Post-Implementation Costs $200,000  
    $225,000
Net Process Cost Savings  $25,000
  
 
Following the calculation of the net benefits, the project leader must determine 
how much of the predicted net savings are Type I benefits, including potential manpower 
reductions.  The Type I benefits are then identified and tracked by Budget Line Item 
(BLI).  ADMS allows the tracking and verification of actual savings compared to 
predicted savings.  The NAVAIR validation process utilizes trained financial 
representatives to assess and validate the reasonableness of the savings as an independent 
analysis.  Provided that the savings are validated and are greater than any applied wedges 
(budget reductions) to the affected BLIs, the project financial lead advises the 
comptroller that the savings can be withheld by BLI. 
The NAE measures all Type I financial benefits against “the wedge,” or dollars 
previously taken out of the budget through mandated reductions.  The intent is to avoid 
“double-booking” financial benefits; giving back savings against a BLI that has already 
been reduced in anticipation of AIRSpeed efficiency gains or other budgetary pressures.  
AIRSpeed is viewed as the tool to recapture the value of the budget reduction.  As a 
result, all Type I benefits reported by the NAE are first measured against the established 
wedge.  Only Type I benefits in excess of the wedge are considered available for 
reinvestments.  Figure 8 illustrates the NAE reported FY-2006 and FY-2007 Type I 






Figure 8.   FY-06 and FY-07 Financial Benefits to "Wedge."  (From: Skinner, 2007) 
As illustrated above, Type I benefits for FY-2006 fell significantly short of the 
“the wedge.”  As such, there would not be an expected return of Type I benefits to the 
resource sponsors for recapitalization.   
D. REINVESTMENT AND RECAPITALIZATION 
In the absence of identifiable AIRSpeed Type I benefits that could be formally 
linked to reinvestment and recapitalization initiatives, this research attempted to identify 
any changes in appropriation trends that could be related to AIRSpeed benefits.  As stated 
in the introduction, the primary incentive for implementing NAE AIRSpeed was to 
counter the alarming trend in reduced aircraft procurement across the FYDP.  This 
research examined this trend to determine if the downward trend had been halted or 
slowed by reduced costs of other aviation programs.  Table 1 illustrates the number of 
aircraft planned for procurement in the Department of the Navy's’ Presidential Budget  
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submissions (PB01-PB08) as programmed across the FYDP.  The final number in each 
column (FY00-FY06) represents the total number of aircraft purchased in the year of 
execution. 
 Number of Aircraft Programmed for Purchase 
  FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
PB01 115 128 130 173 177 187             
PB02    124 88 92 115 119 143 155         
PB03      90 83 85 105 147 193         
PB04        99* 104* 109* 133 191 258 302     
PB05          105 108 127 184 240 285     
PB06            111 128 173 200 249 259 254 











PB08                  177 206 224 221 
 
 
* Includes F-5E aircraft purchased from the government of Switzerland not included in the 
DON Budget Highlights Aircraft Procurement Plan until PB-06 (4 FY03, 4 FY04, 9 FY05; 
included in PB04 supporting tables and exhibits). 
Table 2.   Department of the Navy Aircraft Procurement Plan.  (After: Highlights of the 
Department of the Navy FY 2006/FY 2007 Budget, 2005) 
As depicted in Table 2, PB01 planned to procure 187 aircraft in FY-2005 and in 
actuality only 111 aircraft were purchased.  PB02 programmed the procurement of 143 
aircraft in FY-2006 and only 125 were purchased.  This trend of declining procurement 
plans continues across all years of the FYDP.  The only significant change in the 
downward trend of planned purchases occurred in PB04 due to the purchase of nineteen 
training aircraft that were not previously identified in the procurement plan.  PB04 was 
submitted in February 2003, prior to the establishment of NAE and cannot be directly 
attributed to NAE AIRSpeed financial benefits. 
One of the founding ideas for establishing the NAE and AIRSpeed was the 
concept that the Navy was mortgaging the future to pay current bills.  Given this premise, 
the transfer of funds out of aircraft procurement accounts would be an indicator of the 
significance of this trend.  This research attempted to identify any shift in trends of the 
amount of funds transferred from these accounts in relation to the total Aviation 
Procurement Navy (APN) appropriation amount for the Air Warfare resource sponsor.  
Transfer amounts recorded in the Department of the Navy Program Budget Information 
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System (PBIS) were compared to the total under the Air Warfare (N88) resource sponsor 
APN appropriation.  Below threshold reprogramming totals were considered for FY 1999 
through FY 2007.  A negative transfer rate indicates a transfer out of the N88 APN 
account and a positive transfer rate indicates an increase in the account.  Figure 11 
illustrates graphically the percentage of funds transferred each fiscal year. 



















Figure 9.   Transfer Rates as Percentage of President's Air Warfare APN Budget.  (From: 
Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2005 budget Estimates, 2005; Highlights of 
the Department of the Navy FY 2006/FY 2007 Budget, 2005; Department of the 
Navy’s Program Budget Information System (PBIS), 2007) 
Figure 9 illustrates a steady increase in the transfer rate out of the N88 APN 
account from FY 2003 through FY 2005.  FY 2006 reversed the trend with a positive 
transfer rate.  A preliminary look at the first six months of FY 2007 indicates that the 
negative trend observed prior to FY 2006 may continue in FY 2007. 
The analysis of Air Warfare APN budgets and yearly below threshold transfers 
did not reveal a positive correlation with the implementation of AIRSpeed in FY 2003.  
Negative transfer rates continued to increase, with the exception of FY 2006.  This data 
indicates no beneficial relationship between the observed trend in N88 APN transfer rates 
and the implementation of NAE AIRSpeed.   
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E. RECAPITALIZATION PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS 
This research found no established accounting processes or mechanisms to return 
identified Type I benefits to the resource sponsor for recapitalization.  Identified savings 
resulted in reduced future budgets, were posted against the wedge, or were retained at the 
activity level.  Although the ADMS program identifies and tracks Type I benefits, thus 
enabling the comptroller to place a hold on the appropriate BLI funding, there is no 
mechanism beyond that point to return the funds to the resource sponsor as identified 
AIRSpeed Type I benefits.  There are no lines (accounts) established in the Department 
of the Navy’s Program Budget Information System (PBIS) to link identified AIRSpeed 
benefits to reinvestment opportunities.  (Novak, 2007c) 
The impact of the lack of a recapitalization mechanism to track Type I savings 
back to the resource sponsor was illustrated in the NAVAIR Tomahawk missile program.  
The adoption of AIRSpeed at the Tomahawk Depot resulted in the reduction of fixed and 
variable costs in the missile recertification process.  As a result, the Program Office was 
able to sign a firm fixed price contract for FY 2006 with a combined Type I savings of 
$7.9 million.  (NAVAIR Success Stories by Program or Competency Project Sponsor, 
2006)  The Program Office recognized the savings and attempted to return the savings to 
the resource sponsor.  Since there were no procedures established for returning the 
savings as Type I benefits and evaluating reinvestment opportunities, the funds were 
returned to the Tomahawk Program.  (Novak, 2007c)  In this example, AIRSpeed 
principles resulted in real Type I benefits that could have been utilized for 
recapitalization.  The lack of formal accounting procedures to identify, track and reapply 
the funds beyond the level of the comptroller resulted in a decision to return the funds to 
the responsible program.  The Tomahawk program benefited from the application of 
AIRSpeed and the ability to internally reapply the savings achieved.  The lack of 
visibility of the savings at the Echelon II level and higher, precluded the level of decision 
making authority necessary to apply AIRSpeed Type I benefits to recapitalization. 
It must be noted that during the implementation of AIRSpeed, the NAE identified 
the challenge of returning benefits to the resource sponsor to realign or reinvest as 
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needed.  Another challenge identified was the issue of connecting this process to PBIS 
for the Navy’s budget development and execution.  The Secretary of the Navy’s 
Transformation Team Leaders (TTL) have chartered the Financial Working Group 
(FWG) to address these issues Navy wide.  The FWG’s effort is chartered to: 
(1) Develop a Department of the Navy (DoN)-wide process for calculation, 
categorization, and validation of financial benefits associated with Lean Six Sigma (LSS) 
projects; and  
(2)  Provide DoN Leadership with recommendations for leveraging financial 
benefits resulting from LSS events.   
The FWG has proposed a process to calculate, categorize and validate benefits 
associated with LSS projects, modeled after the NAVAIR process that is automated 
through the ADMS.  Additionally, the FWG is developing a process to link and make 
visible, CPI/LSS efforts in PBIS.  These results have been briefed through various 
leadership levels of OPNAV, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management 
and Comptroller), and the United States Marine Corps.  The FWG plans to continue the 
briefing chain of command and to introduce these concepts to the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Secretary of the Navy sometime in the summer of FY-07.  If 
approved, these process changes will enable Resource Sponsors to have insight into 
CPI/LSS-based results and tie the tracking of those results (by BLI) and benefit 
categorization to PBIS.   This will in-turn provide the data/results transparency necessary 
to capitalize on reinvestment or realignment opportunities or acknowledge the benefits 
that CPI/LSS has yielded against existing budget reductions.  (Novak, 2007c) 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the findings obtained through multiple sources 
associated with NAE AIRSpeed.  These findings provide the background required to 
address the primary and secondary research questions presented in this thesis.  The 
primary research question is best answered in two parts.  First, this research finds that 
measurable cost savings are being achieved through the application of NAE AIRSpeed.  
Savings have been achieved at the Fleet level through the application of AIRSpeed and 
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NAVRIIP, resulting in corresponding reductions in the cost of the Flying Hour Program 
and manpower at the intermediate and depot level maintenance activities.  NAVAIR and 
NAVICP have also identified Type I savings commencing in FY 2006.  Secondly, the 
cost savings achieved through NAE AIRSpeed have not been made available for 
recapitalization.  Identified savings have been applied against other requirements, against 
the wedge or returned to the responsible activity.   
Cost savings have been identified through varying methods, differing between 
years and activities.  Early benefits were identified through efficiency and productivity 
measures.  As AIRSpeed evolved, cost savings were expressed as fund balances 
remaining upon the execution of required expenditures.  NAVRIIP formalized and 
tracked these savings, providing monthly updates and visibility for the Fleet AIRSpeed 
activities.  NAVAIR introduced the ADMS system which identifies, tracks and validates 
financial benefits by BLI.  This system is the most mature and comprehensive in the 
NAE.  This system provides visibility within the activity and provides a mechanism to 
hold the funds pending validation of the predicted savings.  The ADMS system provides 
an opportunity for expansion throughout the NAE.  ADMS could be the foundation of a 
more expansive system designed to link the validated cost savings by BLI in ADMS to 
recapitalization opportunities resident in Department of the Navy financial systems. 
Currently there is no established system for returning AIRSpeed benefits for 
reinvestment.  No accounts have been established in Department of the Navy financial 
systems that can demonstrate a relationship between NAE AIRSpeed cost savings and 
capital reinvestment.  The lack of such accounts prevents senior Navy leadership from 
achieving the visibility over the AIRSpeed benefits and the ability to make decisions in 
relation to reinvestment of those savings.  The Financial Working Group (FWG) has been 
chartered to address these issues Navy wide. 
The policy of measuring AIRSpeed benefits against the wedge (funds that have 
already been taken against a BLI in anticipation of future AIRSpeed benefits or other 
budgetary pressures) does not allow for funds to be captured for reinvestment.  This 
practice assumes that each AIRSpeed activity under the NAE will begin the year at a 
deficit, with the goal of recovering the deficit through AIRSpeed benefits.  Although this 
 63
practice is intended to prevent the “double-booking” of financial benefits it will become 
increasing difficult for activities to exceed the wedge and return benefits for 
recapitalization.  The application of the wedge in anticipation of AIRSpeed financial 
benefits is the equivalent of a top-down cost reduction policy.  Budgets are reduced, 
forcing the activity to find ways to reduce costs.  AIRSpeed is a chosen tool to achieve 
such cost reduction.  However, unless the amount of the wedge is applied to 
recapitalization, or the specific activity realizes benefits greater than the wedge, no 
benefits will be made available for recapitalization. 
The potential for equivalent benefits each year is reduced as AIRSpeed initiatives 
continue to make each organization more efficient and productive.  In each successive 
year, the magnitude of benefits available will likely be reduced as the most readily 
achievable benefits have already been harvested.  If the wedge is based on previous 
benefits, the potential for the activity to surpass the wedge is reduced each successive 
year.  This concept can be illustrated by the wedge placed against the Fleet in FY 2006 of 
$131 million, the amount that the Flying Hour Program was reduced.  The Fleet was only 
able to post $22.9 million in Type I benefits against this wedge in FY 2006.  As the 
Flying Hour Program was executed in FY 2005 at $163 million below budget, this left 
approximately $32 million in potential benefits available to post against the wedge 
without additional realized AIRSpeed benefits.  Despite this fact, the Fleet fell short of 
not only the wedge but also of the $32 million that remained from the previous year's 
benefits.  If AIRSpeed activities are expected to post Type I benefits greater than a wedge 
based on past achievements, it will be increasingly difficult for an activity to exceed this 
requirement.   The wedge is the amount of funds the activity no longer has available 
whether based on past realized benefits or anticipated future efficiencies. 
In summary, this research finds that NAE AIRSpeed has achieved measurable 
cost savings but does not have the systems or processes in place to make the savings 
available for reinvestment and recapitalization.  Multiple methods have been used to 
demonstrate actual cost savings but there are no systems in place to link savings to capital 
reinvestments.  Current financial and managerial policies promote measurable cost 
savings, but only to the extent that they are measured against budget wedges, which are 
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directly related to historical or anticipated future financial benefits.  And finally, current 
financial and budgetary requirements do not allow for the reinvestment of generated cost 
savings. 
The following chapter will analyze the NAE organization and the application of 
AIRSpeed utilizing the models presented in Chapter II of this thesis.  This analysis will 
provide the framework for recommendations to further align NAE AIRSpeed with 
recapitalization requirements. 
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V. NAE AIRSPEED ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) and the 
implementation of AIRSpeed as an organizational change effort.  The focus is on the 
ability of NAE AIRSpeed to achieve measurable cost savings that can be reinvested for 
recapitalization.  As discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence NAE AIRSpeed 
is delivering measurable cost savings.  However, the identified cost savings cannot be 
linked to reinvestments for recapitalization.  This analysis will examine the role of the 
NAE organizational structure, change management process and interactive cost based 
management practices in regards to maximizing AIRSpeed benefits toward the goal of 
recapitalization.  This analysis is conducted through the exploration of the models and 
theories presented in the literature review of Chapter II. 
B. DIAGNOSIS OF THE NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 
An analysis of the NAE requires that the organization be examined from an 
internal, external and a systems perspective.  Mintzberg's Organizational Configurations 
model provides the basis to evaluate the "fit" of an organization.  The model raises 
several questions.  Are the components that make up the organization in balance?  Is the 
organization designed to be efficient, adaptive, or innovative?  Can the organization 
evolve or react to changes in the external environment? 
Nadler's Congruence model provides the means to examine the organization as a 
system, both internally and as it interacts with the external environment.  The basis of the 
Congruence model is that all components of an organization are related and 
interdependent, and must be accounted for in any change effort. 
1. Organizational Configuration 
The formation of the NAE in 2004 was the formal realignment of Naval Aviation 
into a “corporate-like” model, intended to increase internal visibility, promote managerial 
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control and centralize decision making authority.  As the term “enterprise” implies, the 
intent of the alignment was to take bold action requiring broad participation to shape the 
aviation community into a commercial or business like organization.  The organization 
drew collaboration from all activities tied to aviation and placed them under the purview 
of the NAE CEO (Commander, Naval Air Forces) and NAE Board of Directors.  This 
centralization took a loosely diversified organization and attempted to shape it into a 
machine organization.  (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998)  According to 
Mintzberg’s organizational configurations model, a machine organization operates as a 
highly programmed and well-oiled machine.  It has a leader that presides over the 
operating base, technocrats (planners, analysts, etc.), a support staff and a line hierarchy 
to control the operating core of workers. 
Prior to the formation of the NAE, Naval Aviation was comprised of “rather 
independent entities joined together by a loose administrative overlay,” a divisionalized 
organization in Mintzberg’s model. The various entities that comprise the NAE Triad 
produced distinctly different (although related) outputs.  The Fleet generates operational 
readiness, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) deliver systems and hardware, and Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) provides resource funding.  Each entity required uniquely 
specialized skills, a unique organizational structure and appropriate decision making 
authority to best deliver the desired outputs.  According to Minzberg, the divisionalized 
organization requires some level of direct oversight by headquarters, but too much 
interferes with the required autonomy of the divisions.  (Mintzberg, 1981)  Accordingly, 
prior to the establishment of the NAE, the divisionalized nature of traditional Naval 
Aviation was dominated by the middle line component. 
The NAE is designed as a machine bureaucracy, imposing a formalized 
bureaucracy that is vertically oriented, retains centralized power at the top, and requires 
technocratic controls in the form of action planning and the standardization of work.  The 
strength of the technocratic component of the organization would have a significant 
impact on the success of the NAE to manage the transition from a divisionalized 
organization to a machine organization.  The organization depends on the operating 
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processes to insure coordination throughout the organization.  This leads to the 
fundamental question in this analysis.  Is the technocratic component robust enough to 
standardize the processes and keep the organization in balance? 
Mintzberg's configuration model states that every organization reacts to 
underlying pulls of the coordinating mechanisms of the organization.  The NAE reacts to 
three primary "pulls"; the pull to centralize by top management, the pull to divisionalize 
by middle line managers and the pull to standardize by the technocrats.  The 
establishment of the NAE is an intentional increase in "pull" by the top management 
which must be supported by a robust technocratic component.  Is the nature of "pull" 
between the top management and the technocrats in balance and robust enough to 
overcome the traditional pull of the middle line?  This relationship determines the 
balance and ultimately the "fit" of the organization.  The organization will become 
closely aligned with the configuration that has the dominant pull and the success of the 
organization will be affected by the consistency of the internal elements of the 
organization in relation to the configuration pulls.  Further analysis through Nadler’s 
Congruence Model will provide additional insight to these issues. 
2. Organizational Congruence 
Nadler's congruence model expands upon the concept of organizational fit and 
provides a framework for further analyzing the patterns and behaviors of the NAE.  The 
Congruence model is based on the premise that at the center of each organization is a 
highly complex social system comprised of four interrelated components: the work, the 
people, the formal organization and the informal organization.  These central components 
transform the external elements of inputs into the organization's outputs.  Each 
component is directly tied to and influenced by the others.  Changes cannot be made to 
one component without consideration being given to the impacts of that change on the 
remaining components of the organization.  The resulting “fit” of the basic components 
will determine the overall effectiveness of the organization.  The ability of the NAE to 
generate measurable cost savings for reinvestment will be evaluated through this model. 
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In order to understand the ability of an organization to succeed, one must first 
understand what defines success.  What outputs are desired from the NAE AIRSpeed?  
What are the inputs to the NAE that are transformed into the outcomes?  Finally, how do 
the central components of the NAE transform the inputs into the desired outputs?  These 
issues are presented below to evaluate the ability of NAE AIRSpeed to achieve the stated 
goals.  
a. Outputs 
The outputs of NAE AIRSpeed represent the ultimate purpose of the 
organization and are identified through the activities, behavior and performance of the 
organization as a system.  The stated purpose of NAE AIRSpeed is to deliver Fleet 
aircraft ready for tasking at reduced cost.  (Moore, 2006)  The desired outputs include 
quality and productivity improvements, reduced cycle times, and a workforce with the 
right skills, focus and behavior required to deliver the right capability to the Fleet.  An 
additional desired output, and the focus of this analysis, is the harvesting of savings for 
recapitalization.  (Skinner, 2006)  These outputs then become part of the organizational 
history, a critical component of the inputs to the organizational congruence model.  The 
organization must be able to accurately identify the outputs in order to evaluate the inputs 
and formulate a viable strategy. 
The NAE has successfully demonstrated the ability to achieve 
performance improvements in quality, productivity and reduced cycle times through the 
application of AIRSpeed.  The workforce has been exposed to and trained on the 
processes of AIRSpeed.  As a result, a significant degree of enthusiasm has been noted in 
the workforce, especially in the junior ranks which perceive AIRSpeed as an opportunity 
to increase promotion opportunities.  (Sacco & Lovell, 2006)  However, the desired 
output of generating savings available for recapitalization has not yet been evident.  This 





According to Nadler, the inputs to an organizational system are comprised 
of the environment, resources and history.  Specific to the NAE, the inputs include the 
resources provided through budgetary funding, the constraints of the external 
environment and the historical events and activities of the organization. 
Naval Aviation budgetary funding is provided through Congressional 
appropriations.  Congress authorizes and appropriates the annual military budget, which 
is then apportioned by the Secretary of Defense among the services.  Each service chief 
then allocates the funds within his respective service.  Funding is distributed down the 
chain of command until the individual commands have received their annual budget 
authority.  Additionally, the use of these funds is subject to distinct purposes, times and 
amounts for which funds can be used in accordance with appropriation law. 
The NAE is operating in an environment of budgetary pressures caused by 
the decreasing defense funding as a percentage of GDP and overall federal spending, 
deficit spending, and the fiscal demands of the Global War on Terror and the Iraqi War.  
Additionally, the funding received is subject to Congressional oversight.  As Congress 
has the sole authority to provide and maintain a Navy, it controls the funding through the 
power of the purse.  Congress sets limits on the use of those funds, regulates what will be 
done, when it will be done and to what extent.  Funds are limited, restricted, earmarked 
and otherwise designated.  (Practical Financial Management, 2005)  Unless the systems 
and methods established by the NAE are in alignment and are agreed upon by Congress, 
there can be no guarantee that the NAE will be authorized to use funds realized through 
savings for recapitalization. 
The organization’s history influences the workings of the organizational 
body.  The historical context of the NAE must consider past events and activities that 
influence the workings today.  Naval Aviation has historically been a resource consumer, 
generating readiness at any cost.  This consumption mentality was perpetuated by the 
close correlation of budget execution and anticipated readiness achievement.  Under-
execution was perceived as poor management or an indication of over-funding.  In either 
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case, excess funds could be taken and reapplied elsewhere, as determined by a higher 
authority.  Additionally, failure to spend one’s entire budget reduced the chance for 
maintaining that budget in future years.  Through this behavior the budget system 
incentivized the spending of all funds within the appropriation. 
Another component to organizational history is the continuous 
reintegration of the organizational outputs.  The organization's current performance, 
achievements, activities and behaviors all become part of the organizational history.  In 
this way, the outputs continuously impact the historical and environmental inputs of the 
organization.  The organization must be able accurately interpret the current and 
constantly changing inputs while developing the strategy that guides the organization 
forward.  The noted productivity improvements and observed enthusiasm in the junior 
workforce have become a part of the organization's history, and a component of the 
inputs to strategy formulation.   
c. Strategy 
Strategy represents the decisions of the organization about how to 
configure resources, demands, opportunities and constraints of the environment in the 
context of history.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  The NAE stated vision is to "deliver the 
right force with the right readiness at the right cost at the right time, today and in the 
future." (Zortman et al., 2005)  This vision is supported by the strategy outlined in Naval 
Aviation Vision 2020 (Zortman et al., 2005): 
• Harvest efficiencies in the way we conduct business, guaranteeing 
the future of Naval Aviation 
• Execute the Flying Hour Program in a fiscally responsible manner 
• Execute AIRSpeed methodology 
• Align maintenance and supply infrastructures to meet fleet demand 
• Reduce work-in-progress, inventory, and operating expenses at all 
levels of maintenance, supply, and logistics 
• Increase throughput at all maintenance levels  
• Optimize aircraft inventory with the right mix of aircraft for the 
right missions 
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AIRSpeed and NAVRIIP address how each listed strategic objective is to 
be achieved with exception of "harvesting efficiencies in the way we conduct business, 
guaranteeing the future of Naval Aviation."  The NAE Cost Management Team (CMT) 
was formed to address this objective and improve financial management within the 
enterprise, optimize cost-wise readiness and recapitalize aviation assets.  (Zortman et al., 
2005)  The CMT states that these objectives will be met through the below actions 
(Zortman et al., 2005): 
• Develop cost management strategies 
• Implement financial management processes 
• Identify key metrics to support decision making 
• Optimize integration with existing Department of Defense 
planning processes 
• Provide horizontal financial management processes 
This list of objectives demonstrates that the concept of cost management 
within the NAE remains an immature concept.  When the goals include developing 
strategy, implementing processes and identifying metrics, there is arguably not a basis 
established for achieving the strategic objective of "harvesting efficiencies."  The goals 
are vague and do not provide realistic and attainable goals that can be utilized in the 
decision making process. 
The NAE strategy has incorporated the organizational inputs of the 
environment and resources.  The AIRSpeed and NAVRIIP programs are intended to 
counter the external pressures on budgetary resources and provide "the right readiness at 
the right cost."(Zortman et al., 2005)  Through this strategy the NAE has also addressed 
some of the historical inputs to the system, notably the notion of Naval Aviation as a 
resource consumer.  The NAE strategy has elevated awareness of AIRSpeed and 
NAVRIIP methodologies toward readiness achievement by divorcing it from the 
historical correlation to the budget execution. 
The NAE strategy falls short of addressing ability to harvest the savings 
toward reinvestment.  As such, it fails to address the environmental impact of Congress 
and appropriation law on the on the use of funds for recapitalization.  Although the 
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perception of under-execution as poor management may be alleviated by the NAE, there 
remains a very real potential for budget savings to be taken, reapplied and reduced in the 
future.  Therefore, this remains a part of the historical input of the NAE system. 
d. The Work 
Nadler's Congruence model defines work as the basic tasks performed by 
the organization and its parts.  (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  The analysis of the work 
component of the NAE requires consideration of the skills and knowledge of the people, 
the rewards derived from the work, the degree of uncertainty associated with the work 
and any constraints or demands placed on the work.  The skill and knowledge of the 
people is well addressed by the training provided through the deployment of NAE 
AIRSpeed. 
Rewards and uncertainty need to be addressed to insure congruence in the 
organization and the successful generation of outputs.  Individuals who believe they will 
be rewarded will be more motivated to deliver the rewarded behavior.  Rewards in 
professional development have been noted as effective among the junior workers (Sacco 
& Lovell, 2006), but there is no evidence of established rewards for saving toward 
recapitalization.  There must be a reward of adequate significance to offset the historical 
loss of funds and future budget.  Manpower reductions may have a negative impact on 
the achievement of NAE AIRSpeed objectives.  If the workforce perceives their positions 
to be threatened by the achievement of increased efficiencies, the gains in efficiencies 
will cease.  A significant portion of NAE Type I savings are the result of manpower 
reductions, making this a very real concern. 
If the workforce is not motivated by potential rewards or is discouraged by 
the threat of lost employment, AIRSpeed initiatives will not achieve the desired 
efficiency gains and potential costs savings. 
e. The People 
The people of the NAE are described through their knowledge and skills, 
needs and preferences, and perceptions and expectation.  The people of the NAE have 
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substantial knowledge and skill related to AIRSpeed.  Their needs and preferences are 
bases on job satisfaction and achievement.  If the perception is that the efforts of he 
workforce will not directly contribute to the desired outputs (expectations) then 
motivation and commitment to the strategy may waiver.  The expectation is that the 
desired output of NAE AIRSpeed, aircraft ready for tasking at  reduced cost, is being 
achieved though  the strategies of AIRSpeed initiatives and methodologies.  However, the 
expectation that the gained savings is contributing to recapitalization and future readiness 
has not been validated.   
f. The Formal Organization  
The formal organization of the NAE includes the arrangements, structures, 
systems and processes of the organization used to characterize people, work and activities 
to achieve the strategic objectives of the organization.  Simply, it is the rules of the 
organization.   
The NAE’s corporate framework is designed to increase internal visibility, 
promote managerial control and centralize decision making authority.  Critical to these 
issues is the process and system used to provide information to the leadership.  The 
methods employed by the organization for the identification and reporting of identified 
cost savings are not standardized and are suspect in their contributions to informed 
decision making.  Different elements of the organization calculate and report Type I 
savings by different methods.  The Fleet utilizes fund accounting while NAVAIR 
employs the AIRSpeed Deployment Management System (ADMS).  Fund accounting 
results in a historical view of the organization while ADMS allows a more forward 
looking predictive methodology.  This difference precludes the ability to evaluate and 
make actionable decisions that are equally appropriate across the organization. 
Additionally, there currently is no system in place to track and apply cost 
savings achieved by the organization to recapitalization.  NAE leadership is advised of 




available.  Without the formal means to identify, track and apply cost saving to 
recapitalization, the NAE cannot effectively pursue the strategic goal of “harvesting 
efficiencies” toward recapitalization.  
g. The Informal Organization  
The informal organization is made up of the values, the beliefs and norms 
of the organization.  It is influenced by the environment and historical inputs to the 
strategy of the organization.  The NAE has demonstrated a concern and cautiousness over 
reductions in the budget, evident by the choice to report savings against the wedge to 
avoid savings being double-booked (additional budget reductions following the return of 
savings) against the NAE.  This protectionist reaction to anticipated funding shortfalls is 
consistent with the system inputs of current budgetary pressures, the historical trend of 
losing under-executed funds in both the current year and future budgets, and the potential 
loss of control of the funds due to Congressional oversight and the restrictions of 
appropriation law. 
h. Summary of Congruence Analysis 
Nadler’s congruence model provided the basis of a systems look at the 
NAE.  This analysis is effective in identifying the trouble spots and areas of opportunity 
in a change effort.  This analysis has identified the incongruence of the intended outcome 
of “savings available for recapitalization” and the remainder of the organizational system. 
The inability of the system to generate this intended objective can be 
predicted through this analysis.  The inputs to an organization form the basis for strategy 
formulation.  For this reason the leadership must have an accurate depiction of the 
historical nature of organization.  Without effective and accurate methods of measuring 
the outputs of the system, future strategy will be formulated based on incomplete or 
inaccurate historical inputs.  The result will be a flawed or incomplete strategy that fails 
to address the needs and opportunities within the organization. 
Lacking an appropriate strategy, the core components of the organization 
will not have effective guidance on how to generate the desired output.  Rewards and 
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uncertainty will not be properly considered or addressed.  Expectations and motivation of 
the people may waiver when their efforts are not achieving the desired outputs.  The 
formal organization cannot establish appropriate systems and processes to coordinate the 
efforts of the organization.  And finally, the beliefs and values of the informal 
organization will remain anchored to the potentially flawed historical inputs of the 
system. 
The first step to improving these trouble spots is the identification of a 
constant cause.  The basic cause of the organizational incongruence is the lack of 
standardization of the reported outputs.  An accurate and transparent accounting of 
AIRSpeed savings that are available for recapitalization would be reintegrated into the 
organizational history.  Secondly, the standardized reporting would provide leadership an 
accurate depiction of the organizations performance and achievement toward the strategic 
goals.  Thirdly, the combination of viable strategy and consistent visibility of the 
organizational outputs would allow the alignment of the other components in the form of 
rewards, expectations, motivation and finally beliefs.  Lastly, it is the role of the 
formalized organization to establish and maintain the systems and processes required, but 
in congruence with the strategy and outputs of the organization. 
3. Summary: Diagnosis of the Naval Aviation Enterprise as a System 
Mintzberg’s Configurations Model and Nadler’s Congruence model were utilized 
to analyze the “fit” of the NAE in respect to achieving the stated objective of capturing 
AIRSpeed savings toward recapitalization.  The analysis through the Configurations 
model identified the three core components of the NAE as the top management, the 
middle line and the technocrats.  This analysis concludes that these components are not 
balanced.  The technocratic component is not robust enough to support the “pull” of top 
management to centralize.  The processes and systems subject to the development and 
control of the technocrats requires further development and application. 
This finding is consistent with the analysis through the Congruence model.  The 
formal organizational component must develop and apply more robust processes and  
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systems to guide the rest of the organization.  Accuracy, visibility and transparency in 
performance reporting are characteristics of the processes required for the improvement 
of the NAE in both models. 
C. CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION 
This section analyzes the NAE in the context of organizational change.  Naval 
Aviation has been undergoing change related to AIRSpeed since its introduction in the 
NAVAIR Depots in 1999.  The change effort has grown and matured over time as 
AIRSpeed has expanded throughout Naval Aviation and is highlighted with the 
establishment of NAE AIRSpeed in 2006.  As in any business transformation, significant 
barriers exist to the achievement of the NAE’s savings and recapitalization goals.  
Several of these obstacles were identified in the system analysis in the previous section.  
Others will be expanded upon and introduced as factors relating to the success of the 
Naval Aviation change effort.  The review of change management literature identified 
several common factors that are directly applicable to the success of the NAE change 
effort underway.   These issues are examined and will form the basis for future 
recommendations to the NAE.   
1. Vision and Strategy 
Kotter defines vision as “a picture of the future with some explicit commentary on 
why people should strive to create that future.” (Kotter, 1996)  It should clarify the 
general direction of the change; motivate the people and help coordinate the actions of 
the different people.  To be effective the vision should be imaginable and desirable.  The 
NAE vision of “deliver the right force, with the right readiness, at the right cost, at the 
right time – today and in the future,” (Zortman et al., 2005) certainly meets this criteria.  
However, an effective vision should also be feasible; comprisedg of realistic and 
attainable goals. 
The NAE’s strategic objectives address each component of the vision statement 
with exception of the “future” component.  The strategic objective of “harvesting 
efficiencies in the way we conduct business, guaranteeing the future of Naval Aviation” 
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is vague and does not provide realistic and attainable goals that can be utilized in the 
decision making process.  To accomplish goals, the desired results should be clearly 
stated and how to achieve them clearly explained.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  The NAE Cost 
Management Team’s supporting objectives are immature, remain developmental and do 
not yet provide specific guidance.  As a result, the NAE is lacking a clear set of goals and 
priorities in regard to harvesting savings toward recapitalization. 
2. Communication 
Communication is a critical aspect of any organization and most notably any 
organization undergoing significant change.  It is a process, a continuum that touches and 
affects every aspect of the organization.  Nadler concisely summarizes the importance of 
communication; “effective change requires that everyone involved have full access to the 
full range of information required to make appropriate decisions at each step of the 
process." (Nadler & Nadler, 1998)  Communication is defined as the process by which 
information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, 
signs, or behavior.3  The impact of this transfer of information was illustrated in the 
systems analysis of this chapter.  The systems analysis showed that a breakdown in the 
information at any point resulted in an incongruent organization. 
The process of communication should first establish the nature of the information 
to be transferred.  The leadership should specify what will be measured and how the 
information will be presented.  The specification is the key to achieving relevant 
information and should be based on the requirements, frequency, level of detail and 
applicability.  (Geiger, 2000)  The information should be designed to illustrate important 
problems and allow the leadership to make appropriate decisions on the priorities and 
resources.  The components of the NAE are currently reporting their identified Type I 
benefits by differing methods and there is no system in place to link the saving to capital 
reinvestments.  As a result, NAE leadership has to make decisions based on potentially 
                                                 
3 Definition of communication by Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/communication Last accessed April 2007. 
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incomplete, inconsistent, or inaccurate information, hindering the ability to make 
informed decisions on the recapitalization of the Fleet. 
Successful execution of change requires a dialogue that brings reality to the 
surface through openness and candor.  (Bossidy et al., 2002)  Information should be 
accurate, transparent and unambiguous.  The NAE reports identified savings against the 
"the wedge," or mandated reductions in funding.  This practice increases the ambiguity 
and eliminates transparency in the reporting processes of NAE.  It obscures the exact 
nature of achieved saving and recapitalization. 
To summarize the importance of communication, Kotter warns that complacency 
can result from lack of sufficient communication, feedback and poor internal 
measurement systems.  (Kotter, 1996)  The NAE’s lack of accurate and validated 
information impairs the ability of the leadership to make informed and appropriate 
decisions and guide the actions of the organization. 
3. Empower Broad Based Action 
Successful change requires the empowerment of the organization to achieve the 
desired objectives.  This includes the removal of obstacles and making the structures 
within the organization structures compatible with vision:  The organization should align 
the information and personnel systems to the vision.  Unaligned systems block 
achievement of the vision.  (Kotter, 1996) 
The accounting and reporting systems currently in place do not fully capture the 
requirements of the objective to recapitalize savings.  The recapitalization of funds is 
subject to the time, purpose and amount restrictions of appropriation law.  As such, in 
order to track savings for recapitalization, they should be linked to the Department of the 
Navy financial systems through the specific budget line that provided the initial funding.  
The ADMS system of NAVAIR does track savings in this manner, but the rest of the 
NAE does not yet utilize ADMS.  Additionally, any system that tracks or channels the 
funds for recapitalization should consider the same requirements.  
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Empowering the organization also includes eliminating cultural and personnel 
roadblocks.  In the case of the NAE this would include promoting funding transparency 
and eliminating ownership concerns.  In order to achieve this, Geiger recommends 
keeping cost (or saving) forecasts separate from the budget process.  He believes that 
pushing the budget process too low in the organization creates the view that the budget is 
a spending entitlement rather than a target for continuous improvement.  (Geiger, 2000)  
4. Short Term Wins  
Demonstrated achievement of incremental goals will be a key component of the 
long term success of the overall NAE transformational effort.  Short term wins are used 
to sustain momentum by providing concrete feedback on the validity of the vision against 
performance.  (Kotter, 1996)  An effective short term win should be highly visible, 
unambiguous and clearly related to the change effort.  Clear and indisputable 
improvements in performance will make it difficult to resist the change effort. 
Short term wins cannot be left to luck; they should be planned, transparent and 
cannot be open to skepticism.  The point is not to maximize short term wins at the 
expense of the future, but to make sure that visible results lend credibility to the 
transformation effort.  (Kotter, 1996) 
The NAE should demonstrate the achievement of the right readiness, at the right 
cost, at the right time – today and in the future.  The enterprise should show that the 
sacrifices made by the commands and individuals are resulting in the achievement of the 
vision.  A concrete demonstration of this change is necessary to maintain the momentum.  
The example given by the NAE, that the CNAF Flying Hour Program was executed $163 
million under budget in FY-2005, is a testament to the efforts of the change effort.  
However, the example only addresses part of the vision, "current readiness."  To fully 
illustrate the success of the vision, the NAE should indicate a specified and validated 
amount of savings achieved through NAE initiatives that are responsible for the 




NAVAIR saved in $20.0 million that contributed to the purchase of one additional F-18."  
Unless the NAE can clearly link harvested savings to recapitalization the vision will 
remain ambiguous.   
5. Incentives and Rewards 
The NAE has demonstrated the capability to generate and identify measurable 
cost savings through AIRSpeed initiatives.  However, there is currently no policy or 
mechanism in place to reward or provide incentives to a command for generating benefits 
or savings.  There is no mechanism to return any of the achieved savings to the 
commands that generate them, as such, commands may be inclined to spend their budgets 
in full or reapply the savings within the command.  Accordingly, in order for the desired 
behavior of generating savings toward recapitalization to be established, commands must 
believe that their effort will be rewarded.  An incentive program should link rewards to 
performance and make them transparent to the entire enterprise.  "People will understand 
what the organization values and recognizes, that which gets appreciated, respected and 
ultimately rewarded, defines an organizations culture."  (Bossidy et al., 2002) 
6. Summary: Change Management and Execution 
This section analyzed the NAE and the effort to generate measurable cost savings 
toward recapitalization through the context of organizational change.  As in any change 
effort, the NAE faces significant barriers to success.  This analysis identified five areas 
that continue to present challenges to the NAE in the successful implementation of 
change across the organization.  The finding that the NAE has not applied cost savings 
toward recapitalization is, in part, a result of not fully meeting these requirements of the 
change management models. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an analysis of the NAE and the implementation of 
AIRSpeed as an organizational change effort.  This analysis examined the role of the 
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NAE organizational structure and the change management process in regards to 
maximizing NAE AIRSpeed benefits toward the goal of recapitalization. 
The analysis through the Configurations model identified the three core 
components of the NAE as the top management, the middle line and the technocrats.  
This analysis concludes that these components are not balanced.  The technocratic 
component, the planners and analysts, is not robust enough to support the “pull” of top 
management to centralize.  The processes and systems subject to the development and 
control of the technocrats requires further refinement and application.   
This finding is consistent with the analysis through the Congruence model.  The 
formal organizational component should develop and apply more robust processes and 
systems to guide the rest of the organization.  Accuracy, visibility and transparency in 
performance reporting are characteristics of the processes required for the improvement 
of the NAE in both models. 
The analysis of the NAE through the context of organizational change identified 
five major challenges to the NAE in the successful implementation of change across the 
organization.  The five areas identified are vision and strategy, communication, 
empowerment, short term wins, and reward and incentives.  The successful of the NAE in 
addressing these five issues will directly impact the success of the change effort 
underway.  
These findings will form the basis of the future recommendations to the NAE of 
this thesis.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides an external look at the Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed 
program and the stated measure of success; harvesting measurable cost savings and the 
reinvestment of those savings to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine Corps.  It 
presented a review of the background and implementation of NAE AIRSpeed, analyzed 
the relationship between savings and recapitalization; evaluated the effectiveness of the 
financial and managerial controls related to AIRSpeed initiatives; and identified 
organizational barriers to the Naval Aviation Enterprise’s effective achievement of this 
goal. 
This thesis concludes with recommendations to overcome these issues.  It is 
hoped that this analysis will contribute to greater awareness throughout the NAE and 
assist the leadership to further align AIRSpeed programs with the recapitalization vision.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this thesis are presented in the context of the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. 
1. Primary Research Question:   
Has the implementation of AIRSpeed achieved measurable cost savings that have 
been made available to recapitalize the future Navy and Marine Corps? 
The primary research question is best answered in two parts.  First, measurable 
cost savings are being achieved through the application of NAE AIRSpeed.  Savings have 
been achieved at the Fleet level through the application of AIRSpeed and NAVRIIP, 
resulting in corresponding reductions in the cost of the Flying Hour Program and 
manpower at the intermediate and depot level maintenance activities.  NAVAIR and 
NAVICP have also identified Type I savings commencing in FY 2006. 
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Secondly, the cost savings achieved through NAE AIRSpeed have not been 
directly made available for recapitalization.  Identified savings have been applied against 
other requirements, against the wedge or returned to the responsible activity. 
2. Supporting Research Questions: 
a. To what extent do current financial and managerial policies 
allow the generation of measurable cost savings?  
Current financial and managerial policies promote measurable cost 
savings, but only to the extent that they are measured against budget wedges (budget 
reductions imposed in anticipation of future AIRSpeed benefits or other budgetary 
pressures), which are directly related to historical or anticipated future financial benefits.  
The policy of measuring AIRSpeed benefits against the wedge does not allow for funds 
to be captured for reinvestment. 
This practice assumes that each AIRSpeed activity under the NAE will 
begin the year at a deficit, with the goal of recovering the deficit through AIRSpeed 
benefits.  Although this practice is intended to prevent duplicative budget reductions of 
the financial benefits it becomes increasingly difficult for activities to exceed the wedge 
and return benefits for recapitalization.  The application of the wedge in anticipation of 
AIRSpeed financial benefits is the equivalent of a top-down cost reduction policy.  
Budgets are reduced, forcing the activity to find ways to reduce costs.  AIRSpeed is a 
chosen tool to achieve such cost reduction.   
b. To what extent do current financial and budgetary 
requirements allow the reinvestment of generated cost savings? 
Current financial and budgetary requirements do not allow for the 
reinvestment of generated cost savings.  There is no established system for returning 
AIRSpeed benefits for reinvestment.  No accounts have been established in Department 
of the Navy financial systems that can demonstrate a relationship between NAE 
AIRSpeed cost savings and capital reinvestment.  The lack of such accounts prevents 
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senior Navy leadership from achieving the visibility over the AIRSpeed benefits and the 
ability to make decisions in relation to reinvestment of those savings. 
Additionally, the use of savings is subject to specific restrictions of 
purposes, times and amounts for which funds can be used in accordance with 
appropriation constraints.  The systems and methods established by the NAE should be in 
alignment and agreed upon by Congress to fully achieve recapitalization goals. 
c. How are substantiated costs savings identified and linked to 
capital reinvestments? 
Cost savings were identified through multiple methods, differing between 
years and activities.  Early benefits were identified through efficiency and productivity 
measures.  As AIRSpeed evolved, cost savings were expressed as fund balances 
remaining upon the execution of required expenditures.  NAVRIIP formalized and 
tracked these savings, providing monthly updates and visibility for the Fleet AIRSpeed 
activities.  NAVAIR introduced the AIRSpeed Deployment Management System 
(ADMS) which identifies tracks and validates financial benefits by Budget Line Item.  
This system is the most mature and comprehensive in the NAE. 
d. What method(s) can best demonstrate actual cost savings and 
capital reinvestments attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives? 
This AIRSpeed Deployment Management System (ADMS) best 
demonstrates the actual cost savings attributed to AIRSpeed initiatives.  It provides 
formal and standard methodologies for identifying, tracking and validating AIRSpeed 
financial benefits within NAVAIR. It provides visibility within the command activity and 
provides a mechanism to hold the funds pending validation of the predicted savings.  The 
ADMS system provides an opportunity for expansion throughout the NAE. 
ADMS could be the foundation of a more expansive system designed to 
link the validated cost savings by BLI in ADMS to recapitalization opportunities resident 




1. Develop Standardized Reporting System 
It is recommended that the NAE develop and implement a standardized reporting 
system to be utilized by every component and command within NAE.  The selected 
system should accurately identify, track and validate AIRSpeed benefits.  It should be 
capable of providing formal and standardized reporting of the organization outputs that 
can be integrated into organizational decision making and developing policy guidance. 
The AIRSpeed Deployment Management System (ADMS) currently being 
utilized at NAVAIR provides a viable model for the desired system.  It is recommended 
that the NAE implement ADMS in each component of the enterprise.  Additionally, it is 
recommended that ADMS be configured to link the validated cost savings to 
recapitalization opportunities resident in Department of the Navy financial systems. 
2. Implement Recapitalization Accounts 
It is recommended that the Navy develop and implement a mechanism to capture 
and return AIRSpeed savings to the Enterprise, resource sponsors and ultimately the 
CNO for recapitalization.  The NAE and the Department of the Navy should establish 
accounts that track AIRSpeed benefits in the Program Budget Information System 
(PBIS); providing a mechanism for tracking, holding and reapplying AIRSpeed savings 
toward recapitalization.  The accounts should be integrated with a universally employed 
and standardized management system (such as ADMS) and promote transparency in 
funding and recapitalization decisions.  Additionally, such a system should remain 
cognizant of and in accordance with Congressional appropriations law and other policy 
restrictions. 
3. Revisit Strategy for Realizing Recapitalization 
It is recommended that the NAE develop a strategy for generating measurable 
cost savings that can be reinvested for recapitalization.  To be effective the strategy 
should be specific; clearly stated how to recapitalize; present realistic and attainable goals 
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and include rewards and incentives to commands that succeed.  The methodology for 
converting achieved saving into recapitalization should be clearly stated and 
communicated across the organization.  The strategy should be aligned to the structures 
and processes within the organization and empower the organization to overcome 
obstacles and roadblocks; including individual concerns about funding transparency and 
ownership, appropriation law restrictions, and complacency.  The strategy should include 
an incentive program that links rewards to the performance and makes them transparent 
to the entire enterprise.  Success should be planned and demonstrated through the 
achievement of incremental goals, or short-term wins, and then communicated 
throughout the enterprise. 
The author presents the following framework for consideration in strategy 
formulation and execution: 
• Generate  measurable cost savings through the application of AIRSpeed 
methodologies and reinvest those savings to recapitalize the future Navy 
and Marine Corp guaranteeing the future of Naval Aviation 
• Standardize the process of identifying, tracking and validating AIRSpeed 
benefits through the application of a cost and savings reporting system 
across the enterprise. 
• Integrate reinvestment with the existing Department of Defense planning 
processes through the Department of the Navy Program Budget 
Information System 
• Establish realistic and attainable spending goals in the planning process 
and covert into saving goals following budget authorization 
• Reward commands that achieve established goals by returning a portion of 
execution year savings to the command for application to previously 
unfunded requirements (in accordance with time, purpose and amount 
restrictions) 
• Reapply budget year savings to recapitalization opportunities at the 
Enterprise level 
• Return future year savings to the Chief of Naval Operations for 
redistribution in the Future Years Defense Plan. 
• Demonstrate success through short-term wins and then communicate 
throughout the enterprise.  
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D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following questions could be presented for future research: 
1. What are the key components and mechanisms required to link the NAE 
AIRSpeed savings initiatives to Department of the Defense financial systems through the 
Program Budget Information System? 
2. How can the Naval Aviation Enterprise savings and reinvestment 
initiatives be effectively integrated into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) System? 
3. Evaluate the feasibility of enterprise savings and recapitalization in the 
context of the Congressional authority, appropriations requirements and transfer authority 
limits.  Based on the findings, draft a proposal that addresses the limitations imposed on 
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